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Abstract 
The emergence of China as a dominant force in international politics has challenged the 
traditional roles states have played in regions such as the South Pacific. The 2006 Fiji coup 
heralded a new era of competition in the region as PRC policy response conflicted with that 
of existing powers such as New Zealand. China continued to engage and expand its 
relationship with Fiji while New Zealand attempted to isolate the interim Fijian 
administration. This thesis looks at how New Zealand and PRC policy towards Fiji has clashed 
following the 2006 coup and assesses the implications for these powers as well as the long 
term stability of the region. New Zealand responded to the coup by placing strict sanctions 
on Fiji and lobbying the Pacific Islands Forum and the Commonwealth to suspend Fiji’s 
membership. Meanwhile, the PRC expanded its diplomatic, military and financial ties with 
Fiji and provided funding for the MSG, a frequent supporter of the Fijian regime.  
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Chapter one: Introduction 
The South Pacific region is comprised of many sparsely populated island nations with 
underdeveloped economies that are potentially rich in natural resources, yet dependant on 
more powerful states for aid and diplomatic assistance. Traditionally this area has been 
dominated by Western powers who share culture, language and history with the islands. 
This dominance has been challenged by the emergence of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) becoming more involved with the South Pacific politically, economically and militarily. 
New Zealand has constructed political, financial, cultural and historical contacts with the 
region as well as a strong presence in a bilateral and regional context. The PRC has 
traditionally been a less active player in the region and until recently has focussed on 
‘chequebook diplomacy’, effectively buying recognition from island states to contest the 
presence of Taiwan in the region.1 While the ‘Taiwan issue’ still dominates Chinese foreign 
policy it can no longer be seen as the sole motivation for the PRC’s interaction with the 
South Pacific. As China has become more active it has potentially become an alternative 
partner for Pacific states by offering financial, military and political support without the strict 
conditions set by the traditional donors of the region. The 2006 Fiji coup is an example of 
when the approaches of the PRC and New Zealand have clashed. The PRC continued to 
engage with the interim military government while New Zealand sought to isolate the island 
nation through unilateral and multilateral pressure. Such a clash in policy has the potential 
to undermine the stability of the region and both the PRC and New Zealand interests within 
it. This thesis looks at how the policies of New Zealand and the PRC have been opposed 
following the 2006 Fiji coup and examines the implications of this opposition for Fiji, the 
PRC, New Zealand and the wider South Pacific region.  
Overview 
The PRC began actively engaging with the South Pacific as part of a wider contest for 
legitimacy with Taiwan.2 Initially this interaction was characterised by ‘chequebook’ or 
‘dollar diplomacy’ with the ROC and the PRC attempting to effectively buy recognition from 
                                                          
1
 Brook Larmer, "Advantage, Beijing; Taiwan's aim for U.N. membership has been costly and thwarted by 
China's own skill at 'checkbook diplomacy'," Newsweek (2002). 
2
 See T Biddick, "Diplomatic Rivalry in the South Pacific: The PRC and Taiwan," Aisan Survey 29, no. 8 (1989). 
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poor under-populated states.3 This was not limited to the South Pacific, with similar 
diplomatic rivalry occurring throughout the developing world particularly in Africa, Central 
and South America and the Caribbean.4  The South Pacific was particularly attractive for this 
purpose as small developing island states were comparatively cheap to influence.5 This 
heralded new opportunities as well as problems for the region. The competition provided 
states with a new source of income and investment while at the same time restricting their 
foreign policy to choose to recognise either the PRC or the ROC.6  In the 21st century the 
presence of the PRC in the South Pacific has expanded and diversified to not only entrench 
its diplomatic position, but also to exploit the vast natural resources of the region.7 In 
particular,  growth in the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea, mainly for mineral and 
timber resources and for fisheries assets in states such as Fiji.8   
In contrast, New Zealand has traditionally had a more involved role in the South Pacific 
region, not only as a unilateral actor but as an active and founding member of the 
multilateral Pacific Islands Forum.9 New Zealand became progressively more vocal in the 
1980s with the Lange government’s anti-nuclear stance: shifting policy to become focussed 
on threats from outside the region. The 1987 Fiji coups forced New Zealand to look at the 
internal instability of states and the options New Zealand had to reduce such problems.10 
Throughout the 1990s and increasingly in the 21st century, New Zealand foreign policy has 
become more and more concerned with improving governance and reducing poverty in the 
region through unilateral and multilateral means. The 2000 Biketawa Declaration is a good 
example of this increasingly interventionist ‘good governance’ agenda. A New Zealand-led 
forum initiative, the Declaration was drafted as a response to increased violence in 
                                                          
3
 Tamara Renee Shie, "Rising Chinese Influence in the South Pacific: Beijing's "Island Fever"," Asian Survey 47, 
no. 2 (2007). 316 
4
 See Terrence Wesley-Smith, "China in Oceania: New Forces in Pacific Politics," in Pacific Islands Policy 
(Honolulu: East West Centre, 2007). 
5
 T Biddick, "Diplomatic Rivalry in the South Pacific: The PRC and Taiwan," Aisan Survey 29, no. 8 (1989). 801 
6
 Ibid. 801 
7
 Terrence Wesley-Smith, "China in Oceania: New Forces in Pacific Politics," in Pacific Islands Policy (Honolulu: 
East West Centre, 2007). 15 
8
 Bertil Lintner, "The South Pacific: China's New Frontier," in Looking North, Looking South. China, Taiwan and 
the South Pacific, ed. Anne-Marie Brady (Singapore: World Scientific, 2010). 15 
9
 "The Pacific Islands Forum," Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, http://www.forumsec.org.fj/pages.cfm/about-
us/. 
10
 David Lange, "New Zealand's Security Policy," Foreign Affairs 63, no. 5 (1985). 1009 David McCraw, "New 
Zealand Foreign Policy Under the Clark Government: High Tide of Liberal Internationalism," Pacific Affairs 78, 
no. 2 (2005). 220 
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Melanesia. 11 While the wording is often contradictory or ambiguous it provided a 
constitutional basis for the Australia and New Zealand led Regional Assistance Mission to the 
Solomon Islands (RAMSI) in July 2003.12 
The PRC is engaging with states across the South Pacific offering increasingly lucrative 
diplomatic and financial support in exchange for resource access, political recognition and 
diplomatic favours.13 This is occurring at a bilateral level and through grants and support to 
regional organisations such as the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) and the Melanesian Spearhead 
Group (MSG).14 Meanwhile, New Zealand has been putting increasing pressure on Forum 
member states to improve domestic governance standards and the rule of law to achieve a 
stable, prosperous Pacific that aligns itself with New Zealand. The increased engagement of 
the PRC at a regional level provides South Pacific states with greater choice in terms of 
diplomatic, financial and military support. 
The PRC and New Zealand are engaging countries across the South Pacific region to varying 
degrees, usually without policy conflict. Fiji is a good example where both New Zealand and 
the PRC have established interests in different areas and in different ways. Fiji is the most 
developed of the Forum member states outside of Australia and New Zealand and holds an 
important geographical position between Melanesia and Polynesia. It is home to the main 
campus of the University of the South Pacific as well as the Pacific Islands Forum 
Secretariat.15 Despite its relative wealth and regional influence, Fiji has suffered from 
sustained political instability since its independence in 1970, with four coups d’état 
overthrowing democratically elected governments.16 Fiji shares its colonial history with New 
Zealand in addition to having sporting, cultural and established diplomatic interactions. In 
2006, 9,864 New Zealanders identified themselves as ethnically Fijian, illustrating the 
                                                          
11
 See "Biketawa Declaration," Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 
http://www.forumsec.org.fj/resources/uploads/attachments/documents/BIKETAWA%20Declaration.pdf. 
12
 For example the declaration respects the “principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of another 
member state...” while  empowering the Forum to intervene in the domestic affairs of member states in times 
of crisis. See Ibid. 
13
 Terrence Wesley-Smith, "China in Oceania: New Forces in Pacific Politics," in Pacific Islands Policy (Honolulu: 
East West Centre, 2007). 15 
14
 See "MSG Secretariat building handed over to govt," Vanuatu Daily Post, 06/11/2007. 
15
 "Fiji suspension threatens Pacific regionalism," Fiji Sun, 02/05/2009. 
16
 See Brij Lal, One Hand Clapping: reflections on the first anniversary of Fiji's December 2006 coup (Australian 
National University Publishing, 2008). 
 7 
 
demographic links between the two nations.17 At the same time Fiji was the first Pacific 
Island to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC on November 5 1975 and has been 
involved with the PRC since then, with high profile visits from members of the Chinese 
Communist Party and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).18 Despite not having a colonial 
relationship with Fiji, Fiji is home to a number of Chinese migrants, some of whom arrived in 
Fiji as indentured or unskilled labourers to work in Fijian agriculture, as well as a growing 
number of recent legal and illegal migrants from mainland China.19 The exact number of new 
Chinese migrants has been estimated to be between 5000 and 22,000 with Fijian authorities 
privately setting the number at 15,000.20 The editor of Islands Business Robert Keith Reid 
argued that the reason for the ambiguity in the figures is that the government is concerned 
about the response from the public should the real figures be officially published.21  
The most recent coup d’état in 2006 was the fourth since the country’s independence and 
followed an increasing division between Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase and Fijian Military 
Chief Voreqe Bainimarama. The 2006 Fiji coup is significant because it provides a clear 
example in the South Pacific of where the policy approaches of New Zealand and the PRC are 
in conflict. Both the PRC and New Zealand have interests in Fiji but very different 
motivations and methods. The New Zealand government responded to the conflict with a 
policy of pressure and exclusion while the PRC continued to expand its relationship with Fiji.  
Following the 2006 coup, New Zealand sought to generate a regional response to the crisis 
by influencing the Forum as well as the Commonwealth of Nations in an attempt to pressure 
Fiji into holding democratic elections. At the same time the PRC was funding the MSG, a 
vocal advocate of engaging with Fiji. Thus, the PRC-New Zealand policy clash over the Fiji 
coup occurred at a regional as well as at local level. This engagement with the established 
regional organisations shows how both the PRC and New Zealand are interacting with the 
South Pacific as a whole to achieve their respective political objectives in a crisis situation 
                                                          
17
 "2006 Census Data - QuickStats About Culture and Identity," Statistics New Zealand, 
http://search.stats.govt.nz/search?af=&w=ethnicity&date=&button2.x=0&button2.y=0&button2=Search. 
18
 "Bilateral Relations: The People's Republic of China and Fiji," Ministry of Foreign Affairs People's Republic of 
China, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/bmdyzs/gjlb/3392/. 
19
 James  Jiann Hua To, "Sino-Pacifica: Extra-Territorial Influence and the Overseas Chinese," in Looking North, 
Looking South. China, Taiwan and the South Pacific, ed. Anne-Marie Brady (Singapore: World Scientific, 2010). 
55 
20
 Bertil Lintner, "The South Pacific: China's New Frontier," in Looking North, Looking South. China, Taiwan and 
the South Pacific, ed. Anne-Marie Brady (Singapore: World Scientific, 2010). 26 
21
 Cited in Ibid. 26 
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such as the 2006 Fiji coup. This effectively led to a substitution effect: New Zealand used 
sanctions to encourage Fiji to make credible steps towards democracy,  rather than 
pressuring Fiji to change, the PRC replaced New Zealand in many of the areas where 
sanctions were put in place.  While this situation is currently clearest in Fiji following the 
2006 coup, this substitution from New Zealand to China has the potential to take place 
across the region, particularly in Melanesia with Chinese support for the Melanesian 
Spearhead Group.  
Literature review 
This topic suffers from a general lack of accessibility to primary source material. Because the 
coup is an ongoing foreign policy issue for Fiji, the PRC, and New Zealand; most of the 
information is currently inaccessible. The relevant policy working documents in New Zealand 
have been suppressed under s 6(a) of the Official Information Act as prejudicing the 
“security or defence of New Zealand, or the international relations of the Government of 
New Zealand.”22 This stance has also meant that current Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials 
under the Key government as well as those under the former Clark administration have been 
unwilling to contribute to this thesis regarding New Zealand’s position in Fiji following the 
coup and the implications of Chinese involvement there. On the Chinese side, an overall lack 
of transparency in the PRC system has meant that primary source material is limited and 
difficult to access with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China and 
the Chinese embassy in Wellington ignoring requests for more information on Chinese 
involvement in Fiji and the South Pacific. 
The main sources of information that will consequently be used in this thesis are the 
comments, statements and interviews with officials and relevant leaders which have 
appeared in local media sources as well as official policy documents where available. The 
relevant WikiLeaks diplomatic cables will also be used as source material.  These reports 
cannot be viewed as wholly accurate or representative of the exact situation occurring in Fiji. 
However, they do provide insight into the way policy is being formulated and applied to the 
Fijian situation and how the governments’ involved have responded to changes. 
Supplementary interviews were not conducted in this thesis as the relevant officials in 
Wellington, Suva and Beijing were unwilling to comment on the subject matter. 
                                                          
22
 Official Information Act. 
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Retrospective analysis of this situation when official documents become available and 
relevant actors are available to speak freely would be valuable. As such this thesis should be 
viewed as a preliminary examination of the material available to the public relating to the 
coup in the period from 2006-2010. 
The 2006 Fiji coup was seen by many as a continuation of Fiji’s ‘coup culture’, a topic that 
has received comprehensive attention since the first coup led by Sitiveni Rabuka in 1987.23. 
While the 2006 coup shares a number of its characteristics with previous coups, it can be 
distinguished by both domestic and international changes since the interventions of Speight 
and Rabuka. While the previous coups were also based on racial divisions within Fiji, Speight 
and Rabuka were focussed on maintaining ethno-Fijian superiority, Bainimarama professed 
to be breaking down traditional racial barriers.24 In contrast to previous coups Bainimarama 
also worked towards reducing the powers of ethno-Fijian dominated institutions such as the 
Great Council of Chiefs and the Methodist Church.25 Bainimarama’s 2006 coup was distinct 
from previous coups in its motivation and its execution. 
New Zealand’s role in the South Pacific had been traditionally focussed upon Polynesia, with 
New Zealand Island territories in the region as well as shared historical and cultural ties.26 
The greater South Pacific was to an extent a triangle of outside influence, with New Zealand 
watching over Polynesia, Australia covering Melanesia and the United States overseeing 
Micronesia.27  Over the past decade this broad distinction has been replaced by a trans-
Tasman focus on Melanesia following crises in Bougainville, the Solomon Islands and Fiji.28 
Official reports, speeches and policy documents make up the majority of in-depth research 
on New Zealand’s role and long-term direction in the South Pacific, produced predominantly 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFAT), New Zealand Aid (NZAID), The Ministry of Defence 
(MOD), and The Prime Minister’s office.29 The most comprehensive document outlining New 
                                                          
23
 Shalendra Sharma, "The Politics of Race in Fiji," Economic and Political Weekly 22, no. 49 (1987). 
24
 Jon Fraenkel, "Melanesia in Review: Issues and Events, 2009," The Contemporary Pacific 22, no. 2 (2010). 
25
 See Ibid; "Bainimarama renews promise of Fiji elections," Fijilive, 08/04/2008.and  
26
 "Frequently asked questions about New Zealand's policy towards Fiji ", Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations/Pacific/0-Fiji-FAQ.php. 
27
 Bertil Lintner, "The South Pacific: China's New Frontier," in Looking North, Looking South. China, Taiwan and 
the South Pacific, ed. Anne-Marie Brady (Singapore: World Scientific, 2010). 11 
28
 Gerard and Wesley-Smith Finin, Terrence, "Coups, Conflicts and Crises: The New Pacific Way?," Race and 
Class 42, no. 4 (2001). 
29
 See "New Zealand's development assistance in the Pacific," NZAID, 
http://www.nzaid.govt.nz/library/docs/factsheet-pacific-overview.pdf. 
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Zealand’s role in the South Pacific is the Pacific Strategy 2007-2015.   Despite widespread 
changes in the structure and focus of NZAID in 2009, this remains the most detailed account 
of New Zealand’s development principles and direction in the South Pacific.30 This is 
supplemented by the Pacific Plan, a ‘living document’, agreed upon by Forum Members for 
the long-term development of the Pacific, that sets out principles to follow and objectives to 
meet for development to occur.31  
New Zealand has had a long and generally favourable relationship with Fiji, not only in terms 
of development assistance, but also through sporting, cultural, and historical links. Most of 
the literature on New Zealand’s broad relationship with Fiji is through NZAID and MFAT 
sources as well as groups such as the Fiji-New Zealand Business Council.32 NZAID has a 
comprehensive development plan for Fiji (drafted before the 2006 coup and 2009 NZAID 
reforms) which sets out the role NZAID plays in Fiji as well as the most important areas for 
aid to be allocated.33 However, the role New Zealand has played in Fiji has been sporadic, as 
it has traditionally rescinded a number of its financial and diplomatic links when coups take 
place in Fiji.34 The New Zealand government response to the 2006 coup was swift with New 
Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark announcing immigration, development assistance, 
travel, and diplomatic sanctions the day after coup leaders assumed power.35 There is a large 
volume of relevant scholarly literature on the underlying causes of Fiji’s ‘coup culture’ and 
analysis following the 2006 coup is no exception. Fraenkel examines the root causes of the 
coup in Fiji and critically examines the argument put forward by Bainimarama that it was a 
‘coup to end all coups.’36 Lal assesses the impact the coup has had in Fiji a year on, looking in 
particular at the domestic political environment and the lack of obvious unrest from the 
Fijian population.37 
                                                          
30
 Murray McCully, 16/12/2008 2008. 
31
 "The Pacific Plan,"  (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2005). 
32
 "Fiji Background Paper and NZAID/Fiji Country Strategy," NZAID, 
http://www.nzaid.govt.nz/library/docs/nzaid-fiji-strategy-2005-2010.pdf. 
33
 Ibid. 
34
 David McCraw, "New Zealand Foreign Policy Under the Clark Government: High Tide of Liberal 
Internationalism," Pacific Affairs 78, no. 2 (2005). 
35
 Helen Clark, "NZ imposes wide range of sanctions on Fiji " Prime Minister's Office, 
http://www.beehive.govt.nz/node/27990. 
36
 Jon. Firth Fraenkel, Stewart. Lal, Brij, ed. The 2006 Military Takeover in Fiji: A Coup to End All Coups? 
(Australian National University Press,2009). 
37
 Brij Lal, One Hand Clapping: reflections on the first anniversary of Fiji's December 2006 coup (Australian 
National University Publishing, 2008). 
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What this literature focuses on is the domestic and political implications of the coup for Fiji 
and the causes of such political unrest. The research that is missing is analysis on the 
implications for outside powers such as New Zealand. A large number of newspaper articles 
supplement the official reports, however in-depth independent analysis of New Zealand’s 
post-coup response is lacking. In the post-coup period, despite a change in government for 
New Zealand, few official policy documents have been created on the subject of Fiji. 
Reporting of New Zealand’s position has been more detailed, in particular surrounding the 
expulsion of New Zealand’s High Commissioners.38 Given that the Bainimarama government 
is still in power in 2010, it would seem that efforts from New Zealand have failed in 
pressuring Fiji to hold democratic elections.  
New Zealand’s role in the Pacific islands Forum has been increasingly well documented, 
particularly after conflicts in the Solomon Islands, Fiji, Bougainville and Papua New Guinea. 
Despite being intended to be a union of equals, Kelsey argues that the Forum has been 
increasingly dominated by New Zealand and Australia, creating a rift between South Pacific 
states and what are seen as a union of Western Powers.39 Young argues that, although New 
Zealand developed a strong independent voice in the Forum in the 1990s (exemplified by the 
New Zealand-led Bougainville negotiations), policy has become increasingly consistent with 
that of Australia in the South Pacific.40 Since 2000 New Zealand and Australia have pushed 
an agenda of ‘good governance’ on the South Pacific, as in the 2000 Biketawa Declaration, 
which allowed collective action to resolve security problems in the Pacific.41 Henderson 
argues that pressuring democratic rule onto states may be counterproductive as Pacific 
states may feel alienated from Australia and New Zealand and look north to Asia for 
assistance without good governance conditionality.42 
Over the past 25 years a considerable volume of literature has emerged on the threat posed 
by an increasingly powerful PRC. As early as 1971 Maxwell assessed the implications of a 
                                                          
38
 See Murray McCully, "NZ Government disappointed by Fiji move," Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
http://beehive.govt.nz/release/nz+government+disappointed+fiji+move. 
39
 Jane  Kelsey, "Australia and NZ's power politics breed resentment in Pacific," New Zealand Herald, 
06/08/2009. 
40
 Audrey Young, "Pacific needs NZ voice," New Zealand Herald, 13/10/2007. 
41
 "Biketawa Declaration," Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 
http://www.forumsec.org.fj/resources/uploads/attachments/documents/BIKETAWA%20Declaration.pdf. 
42
 John Henderson, "The future of democracy in Melanesia: What role for outside powers?," Asia Pacific 
Viewpoint 44, no. 3 (2003). 
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developing China on the international order.43 This area of research has grown rapidly with 
its primary focus on the implications for the United States.44 Given the current and past 
hegemonic dominance of the US, any emerging power effectively challenges the existing 
world order and consequently the position of the United States.45 Concerns about an 
increased Chinese presence in the South Pacific by both New Zealand and the United States 
were revealed in a leaked diplomatic cable noting in particular increased People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) aid to defence forces in Fiji and Tonga.46 Perhaps the most substantiated threat 
posed by China has been the Taiwan issue and escalation of conflict in the Taiwan Strait.47 
The current cooling of relations between the PRC and the ROC has shifted academic and 
political opinion further away from an imminent or readily foreseeable conflict in the Taiwan 
Strait. Brady is more sceptical, claiming that the truce is only likely to remain if Beijing 
believes that Taiwan is making steps towards reunification.48  
The late Ron Crocombe commented that a power vacuum left by the US and Europe in the 
Pacific has let Asian powers and in particular China, play a greater role in the region.49 
Whether this expansion into the Pacific can be seen as a threat to Pacific Island nations and 
their traditional partners is subject to much speculation and debate within both the foreign 
policy and academic communities. Academics such as Wesley Smith comment on the 
inevitability of a greater Chinese role in the South Pacific given the rapid economic growth 
China has experienced over the last 25 years. The resources and location of the Pacific in 
relation to China make it a prime region for economic exploitation and diplomatic 
recognition.50 Lintner has a different interpretation of the PRC’s interaction with the South 
                                                          
43
 Neville Maxwell, "'The Threat from China'," International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-
) 47, no. 1 (1971). 
44
 See "ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China," Office of the 
Secretary of Defense. 
45
 Randall Peerenboom, China Modernizes: Threat to the west or model for the rest (Oxford University Press, 
2007). 
46
 Audrey Young, "NZ disturbed by China's rising power in Pacific," New Zealand Herald, 21/12/2010. 
47
 Jonathan I. Charney and J. R. V. Prescott, "Resolving Cross-Strait Relations between China and Taiwan," The 
American Journal of International Law 94, no. 3 (2000). 
48
 Anne-Marie; Henderson Brady, John, "New Zealand, the Pacific and China: The Challenges Ahead," in Looking 
North, Looking South. China, Taiwan and the South Pacific. Looking North, Looking South. China, Taiwan and 
the South Pacific., ed. Anne-Marie Brady (Singapore: World Scientific, 2010). 
49
 Ron Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands (IPS Publications, 2007). 
50
 Terrence Wesley-Smith, "China in Oceania: New Forces in Pacific Politics," in Pacific Islands Policy (Honolulu: 
East West Centre, 2007). 
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Pacific, seeing it as a deliberate move by the PRC to challenge the traditional powers in the 
region.51  
A Chinese presence in the region is in no way limited to the actions of the PRC government, 
Chinese migrants have resided in the South Pacific since the 1800s. James Hua To 
categorises these overseas Chinese into two groups, laoqiao or ‘old Chinese’ and xinqiao or 
‘new Chinese.’52 ‘Old Chinese’ came to the South Pacific as labourers in the 1800s and early 
1900s, most of whom have assimilated well into Pacific populations.53 An influx of ‘new 
Chinese migrants’ are a more recent development and a cause of growing concern in the 
South Pacific as they are more separated from the local cultures.54 Migrant ‘new Chinese’ in 
the South Pacific have been blamed for instability in the region with Chinese businesses 
specifically targeted in the 2006 riots in the Solomon Islands and Tonga.55 Such populations 
are also potentially a threat as increasing numbers of legal and illegal migrants from the PRC 
are coming to the South Pacific. Not only are they dominating local economies, a small 
number are also being increasingly linked to domestic and transnational criminal activities, 
resulting in further marginalisation of ethnic Chinese and the destabilisation of Pacific 
societies.56 This has the potential to exacerbate existing economic and political tensions in 
South Pacific states and may lead to new tensions between local populations and new 
Chinese migrants. 
The most widely-covered and expanding area of literature on the PRC in the South Pacific is 
the role of the PRC government in South Pacific states. Since the early 1990s the PRC has 
been spending vast amounts of money in South Pacific states. This funding has not been 
through traditional aid channels but more focussed on large-scale projects such as 
government buildings and sporting complexes.57 Dobell argues that this large-scale spending 
                                                          
51
 Bertil Lintner, "The South Pacific: China's New Frontier," in Looking North, Looking South. China, Taiwan and 
the South Pacific, ed. Anne-Marie Brady (Singapore: World Scientific, 2010). 
52
 James  Jiann Hua To, "Sino-Pacifica: Extra-Territorial Influence and the Overseas Chinese," in Looking North, 
Looking South. China, Taiwan and the South Pacific, ed. Anne-Marie Brady (Singapore: World Scientific, 2010). 
53
 Ron Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands (IPS Publications, 2007). 
54
 James  Jiann Hua To, "Sino-Pacifica: Extra-Territorial Influence and the Overseas Chinese," in Looking North, 
Looking South. China, Taiwan and the South Pacific, ed. Anne-Marie Brady (Singapore: World Scientific, 2010). 
55
 Ron Crocombe, "The Software of China-Pacific Island Relations," in Looking North, Looking South. China, 
Taiwan and the South Pacific, ed. Anne-Marie Brady (Singapore: World Scientific, 2010). 
56
 James  Jiann Hua To, "Sino-Pacifica: Extra-Territorial Influence and the Overseas Chinese," in Looking North, 
Looking South. China, Taiwan and the South Pacific, ed. Anne-Marie Brady (Singapore: World Scientific, 2010). 
57
 G Dobell, "China and Taiwan in the South Pacific: Diplomatic Chess versus Pacific Political Rugby," (Lowy 
institute for International Policy, 2007). 
 14 
 
can be explained largely by the aforementioned practice of chequebook diplomacy.58 Linter 
contests that such a practice is utilised to gain favour in South Pacific states and to 
effectively push out the influence of traditional powers such as Australia and New Zealand.59 
Hanson is more sceptical, arguing that Chinese chequebook diplomacy is poorly planned and 
delivered and as a consequence lacks the long term ability to depose the traditional powers 
as Lintner suggests.60 In either case South Pacific states have welcomed the funding from the 
PRC, particularly as the only official condition for such aid is the recognition of the ‘One 
China’ policy.61  
Once again the intentions of Chinese funding in the South Pacific are difficult to determine. 
However, the extent of China’s diplomatic interactions in the South Pacific has led to 
speculation amongst academics and policy makers alike. Dobell brings up the well-
established argument that China now has more diplomats in the South Pacific than any other 
country.62 Yang expands on this by noting that in recent years it has become the practice for 
South Pacific leader’s first official visit to be to Beijing and not to Canberra or Wellington.63 
Maclellan argues that Australia is still the dominant power in the Pacific but its policy has 
become increasingly challenged in the region as states expand their aid and diplomatic 
contacts.64  
China has had a long history of engagement with Fiji and consistently good relations with the 
South Pacific nation. Very little has been written on the historic involvement of China in Fiji, 
although Crocombe addresses this briefly but in the context of the South Pacific region 
rather than Fiji in particular.65 Most of the literature regarding the position of the PRC in Fiji, 
which does not pertain to the recent coup, revolves around the aforementioned growth of 
Chinese diplomatic and financial support.66 Shie argues that the PRC presence in Fiji as in the 
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rest of the South Pacific has increased rapidly since the late 1990s.67 Despite being an 
increasingly powerful minority in Fiji, little has been written examining the implications of a 
Chinese population that may outnumber the Indian Fijians in the future68.  In addition, the 
Chinese government has produced documents on the bilateral agreements between the PRC 
and Fiji as well as the number of official visits that eminent PRC officials have made to Fiji. 
What is missing is an accurate account of the financial relationship that the PRC undoubtedly 
has with Fiji.69 
Historically, China has neither publicly applauded, nor actively condemned Fiji after previous 
coups. 70  Many academics argue that the 2006 Fiji coup response signalled a change in PRC 
policy in the South Pacific. Instead of not reacting diplomatically or financially to the coup, 
the PRC increased its diplomatic and financial links with Fiji. Hanson argues that such a policy 
by Beijing was deliberate but misguided as Bainimarama lacks popular local support. As a 
way of winning over the thoughts and minds of the Fijian people, propping up an unpopular 
leader was not a long-term strategy for improved relations.71 Yang notes that such an influx 
of support from Beijing was signalled before the coup at the First Ministerial Conference of 
China Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum in 2006 when 
Laisenia Qarase was still in power.72 Both Hanson and Yang acknowledge that the PRC has 
rapidly increased support for Fiji since 2006: the disagreement surrounds whether the 
increase in aid has been caused by the 2006 coup and sanctions imposed by states such as 
New Zealand. 
 
Following the 2006 Fiji coup, financial support from the PRC to Fiji increased significantly. 
Lintner and Hanson both cite a figure of between US$150million and US$135 million in 
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financial support from the PRC to Fiji. 73 In 2008 the PRC allocated approximately US$90 
million for Fijian projects while New Zealand provided US$1.76 million (see appendix one). 
Chinese state news agency Xinhua comments in 2010 that Fijian sugar cane growers have 
benefitted from 600 tonnes of Chinese fertiliser, Fijian women have been given US$98,825 
worth of sewing machines, as well as a US$36.2 million soft loan for Fijian housing.74 All 
these reports signal a significant and long term support plan for Fiji from the PRC. D’Arcy 
comments that such funding puts New Zealand’s stance of exclusion on shaky ground, as 
Chinese support for Fiji is now far greater than was given by New Zealand even before the 
2006 coup.75 Such soft loans and grants are generally given by the Chinese Ministry of 
Finance rather than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or a semi-dependent aid body.76 This 
division makes it difficult to accurately calculate the real support from the PRC. 
In other areas of the South Pacific, the role of the PRC in the Forum is also being questioned. 
Henderson comments that despite the PRC not being a voting member of the Forum it is 
investing large amounts of money in the Forum and increasing diplomatic and trading 
relationships with the group.77 Similarly in other areas of the Pacific, what China wants out 
of the Forum is unknown.  In the rest of the literature on the Forum China’s role is 
predominantly discussed through the media outlets of the Pacific. The Vanuatu Daily Post 
comments on how the PRC funded the secretariat building for the MSG.78 Once again 
comprehensive analysis is difficult to find. 
Overall the literature examining the role New Zealand and China have played in Fiji and the 
implications of that role is very much focused on the implications for the Fijian people as 
well as the repercussions of South Pacific states looking North rather than South.79 What is 
missing is analysis examining how New Zealand will be affected if it maintains its ‘good 
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governance’ agenda80 while China offers seemingly unconditional diplomatic and financial 
incentives to switch allegiances.81 This thesis seeks to examine the responses to the Fiji coup 
and assess whether this signals a long term trend for Fiji and the South Pacific Region.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
80
 New Zealand under the Clark government focussed on improving governance in the South Pacific, directing 
aid to improve democratic institutions and the rule of law and championing the Biketawa declaration for the 
Forum to intervene when good governance is not upheld in the region. This has relaxed more recently with the 
Key government with a redirection of New Zealand’s aid policy. 
81
 See Jiabao Wen, "Chinese Premier's keynote speech at opening of 1st Ministerial Conference of China Pacific 
Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum," China Pacific Island Countries Economic 
Development and Cooperation Forum, http://www.chinaembassy.org.in/eng/zyjh/SPEECHES/t244242.htm. 
 18 
 
Chapter two: Historical context of the 
2006 coup 
Over the past twenty years, China has undoubtedly stepped up its presence in the South 
Pacific, but prior to 1990 the PRC influence in the region was much more passive. New 
Zealand and Australia were the dominant powers in Melanesia and Polynesia, while the 
United States was most active in Micronesia. China was mainly engaged with the South 
Pacific through its overseas Chinese population, a focus which began to shift with the 
increasing diplomatic rivalry with the ROC in Taiwan.82 This chapter looks at the history of 
political instability in the South Pacific and Fiji in particular, addressing specifically the 
politics of race and cultural identity in Fiji and linking these features to other South Pacific 
states. It examines the relationship between China, New Zealand and the South Pacific, 
assessing how both New Zealand and the PRC respond to conflict or instability. Then it will 
examine the changing power dynamics between New Zealand and China in the South Pacific.  
New Zealand seeks to improve governance, while China engages South Pacific countries in a 
struggle to diplomatically outmanoeuvre Taiwan. The 1987 and 2000 coups are appraised in 
detail. Finally, the 1st Ministerial Conference of China Pacific Island Countries Economic 
Development and Cooperation Forum is examined and its implications for the South Pacific 
and Fiji in particular are assessed.  
Historically, New Zealand and the PRC have had very different perspectives and relationships 
within the South Pacific. New Zealand shares the colonial heritage of many states in the 
region and has played a governing role over a number of South Pacific states since 1900. In 
particular, a chequered rule over Western Samoa.83 Even today New Zealand has a 
significant governorship role over the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau.84 China, on the other 
hand, has played a much more passive role: Chinese migrants were often brought to the 
South Pacific as indentured labour (much like the Indian Fijian population), or as low wage 
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labourers.85 These ‘old Chinese’ in the South Pacific tended to integrate with the local 
populations and engage with local cultures and traditions.86 This population generally 
migrated to the South Pacific prior to the 1949 Chinese revolution, so these Chinese were 
not overtly associated or aligned with either the ROC or the PRC. Because of this, the PRC 
has taken an active role to encourage overseas Chinese to support the PRC over Taiwan.87 
Over time, New Zealand has engaged with the South Pacific in a number of ways: through 
joint initiatives with Australia, solely New Zealand initiatives and through the South Pacific 
Forum which was formed in 1971 and renamed the Pacific Islands Forum in 2000 in order to 
recognise the Micronesian member states.88 The Forum was founded by: Australia, Cook 
Islands, Fiji, Nauru, New Zealand, Tonga and Western Samoa (now Samoa).89 It has since 
grown to include the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Palau, 
Papua New Guinea (PNG), the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and 
Vanuatu.90 The Pacific Islands Forum has been used by New Zealand extensively with 
Australia and New Zealand tending to dominate Forum meetings.91 New Zealand and 
Australia have even been seen by some commentators to have a hegemonic role in the 
South Pacific.92 This “governorship” role New Zealand has played, through the Forum and 
the pressure being put on states to improve governance standards and implement freer 
markets through agreements such as PACER and PICTA, can be seen as distinguishing New 
Zealand and Australia from the rest of the Forum States.93 While New Zealand views its role 
as giving a “helping hand” to the South Pacific,94 a number of Pacific leaders and political 
                                                          
85
 Bertil Lintner, "The South Pacific: China's New Frontier," in Looking North, Looking South. China, Taiwan and 
the South Pacific, ed. Anne-Marie Brady (Singapore: World Scientific, 2010). 17 
86
 Ibid. 17 
87
 James  Jiann Hua To, "Sino-Pacifica: Extra-Territorial Influence and the Overseas Chinese," in Looking North, 
Looking South. China, Taiwan and the South Pacific, ed. Anne-Marie Brady (Singapore: World Scientific, 2010).  
88
 "The Pacific Islands Forum," Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, http://www.forumsec.org.fj/pages.cfm/about-
us/. 
89
 Ibid. 
90
 Ibid. 
91
 Audrey Young, "Pacific needs NZ voice," New Zealand Herald, 13/10/2007. 
92
 Ibid. 
93
 Jane  Kelsey, "Australia and NZ's power politics breed resentment in Pacific," New Zealand Herald, 
06/08/2009. 
94
 "Fiji Background Paper and NZAID/Fiji Country Strategy," NZAID, 
http://www.nzaid.govt.nz/library/docs/nzaid-fiji-strategy-2005-2010.pdf. 9 
 20 
 
commentators have perceived New Zealand’s behaviour as “bullying” Pacific states to follow 
New Zealand’s agenda.95 
The Pacific Islands Forum is an area where New Zealand has an advantage over China for 
relations with South Pacific nations. Being a full member of the Forum, New Zealand has the 
ability to directly influence matters in the South Pacific, such as the 2000 Biketawa 
Declaration (further discussed later in the chapter), the RAMSI intervention mission and the 
Pacific Plan.96 However, the Forum is largely a consensus-based institution and so New 
Zealand’s presence as a voting member should not be overstated. As mentioned in Chapter 
One, the PRC was made an official Post Forum Dialogue Partner in 1990.  While this does not 
give the PRC voting privileges in the official Forum processes, it allows the PRC to sit in on 
Forum meetings and raise any Pacific issues or propositions in the Dialogue process that 
directly follows the Forum. Interestingly, the first Chinese representative to attend a Forum 
meeting was the Chinese Ambassador to Fiji in 1988, the year after the first Rabuka coup, 
showing China’s continued interest in the region.97  
As noted above, the PRC has historically played a latent role in the South Pacific. This is, in 
part, due to the complex nature of Chinese foreign policy.98  The overseas Chinese may have 
been active in the South Pacific, but their actions and views must be distinguished from 
those of the PRC government.99 Migrant Chinese are often viewed as the face of the Chinese 
people in the South Pacific.100 The influence of the ‘old Chinese’ has had a largely positive, 
stabilising effect on the South Pacific, aiding delicate economies of South Pacific states.101 
These established Chinese have seldom sought political office in the South Pacific and have 
successfully integrated into local communities.102 The newer migrant Chinese, however, 
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pose a problem for the South Pacific, and consequently, for PRC legitimacy in the region. 
Unlike the established Chinese, these recent Chinese migrants are often interested in 
becoming rich quickly in the small economies of South Pacific states.103 Rather than 
improving the economies of the islands, this has led to increased levels of unemployment 
and resentment from local Pacific communities. For example, in Tonga in the 1980s there 
were no Chinese-owned grocery stores in the country; by the early 2000s more than 70 
percent of all grocery stores were owned by new Chinese migrants.104 This influx of new 
migrants has been argued to be partly responsible for the looting and burning of China Town 
in the Solomon Islands and the burning of Chinese owned shops in Tonga in 2006.105 
These new migrants to the South Pacific have not only destabilised the South Pacific by 
replacing local people in businesses, a growing number of new Chinese migrants have been 
linked to transnational criminal activities.106 The underdeveloped legal institutions of the 
South Pacific may be viewed as easy to deceive: their short jail terms may be worth the gains 
of such criminal activities.107 In particular, drug trafficking is becoming a problem for many 
South Pacific states; in 2000 357 kilograms of heroin was discovered in Fiji after being 
imported by Chinese migrants, its intended market Australia and South America.108 Some of 
these new migrants have arrived illegally in South Pacific states, others have remained 
illegally after Chinese government-funded projects have been completed, or jumping ship 
when vessels make landfall.109 This situation has deteriorated to the extent that illegal PRC 
migrants now arguably outnumber legal migrants in the South Pacific.110 This is a problem 
for South Pacific states as they often do not have the ability to adequately deal with a 
growing illegal migrant population. 
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These new migrants, particularly those who remain after PRC government development 
projects, are becoming an increasing subject of discontent in South Pacific states.111 The 
problem is that illegal immigrants cannot simply be deported back to the PRC, because the 
Chinese government will not accept deportees without travel documents.112 These take time 
to arrange and often the request for deportation is denied, giving Pacific states little option 
but to deal with these illegal immigrants locally, further adding to unemployment and 
instability problems already existent throughout the South Pacific. 113 Tensions between local 
populations and Chinese migrants were shown with the 2006 Nuku’alofa and Honiara riots 
targeting Chinese owned stores.114 In 2009 Fiji established a specialised Asian immigration 
unit to deal with illegal migrants, the majority of whom were from the PRC.115 China, 
therefore, can be seen as a potentially destabilising factor in the South Pacific. In a similar 
vein, New Zealand has been viewed as a coercive or ‘bullying’ force.  
 
The end of the Cold War undeniably changed the way states interact, set free from the 
capitalist/communist ideological dichotomy that divided the international system. This 
changing face of world politics was in part reflected in the emergence of humanitarian 
interventions and the “responsibility to protect”116, which led to much publicised incursions 
in Somalia (1992), Haiti (1994), Kosovo (1999) and East Timor (1999).117 This changing 
framework in the international community did not escape the South Pacific, which was 
brought to the forefront with the 1999 East Timor intervention.118 While conflict and 
instability had been relatively commonplace in the South Pacific, the growing norm of 
intervention and the foreign policy directions of the Clark and Howard governments made 
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intervention more likely. As the ‘strategic governors of the region,’ Australia and New 
Zealand became interested in stabilising the region.119 The policies of the Clark government 
can be distinguished from those of the Howard government in Australia, however, the 
coordination of strategies in the South Pacific was often drafted as a unified Australian and 
New Zealand voice. During this period, particularly in Melanesia a number of high profile 
conflicts in Papua New Guinea, East Timor, the Solomon Islands and Bougainville encouraged 
Howard and Clark to adopt increasingly interventionist policies towards the region.120 
The culmination of the South Pacific conflicts and the emerging intervention norm was the 
drafting and adopting of the 2000 Biketawa declaration by the Pacific Islands Forum. 
Following the 2000 Fiji coup, Clark was no longer willing to accept that instability and conflict 
in the South Pacific was the ‘Pacific way’ and so, with the help of Australia, Samoa and 
Kiribati the Biketawa Declaration was drafted.121 This document effectively changed the 
mandate of the Forum. Like other regional organisations such as ASEAN, the Forum had a 
policy of non-intervention in the domestic political situations of other member states. 
Biketawa achieved a number of things, some clearly and some less clearly. Biketawa outlines 
that member states are bound by a number of guiding principles, while recognising that they 
are sovereign independent states with regional and domestic obligations.122 These principles 
cover a number of areas, notably that member states are to uphold “democratic processes 
and institutions which reflect national and local circumstances, including the peaceful 
transfer of power, the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary, just and honest 
government.”123 Therefore, Biketawa tries to encourage democratic governance, while 
respecting the traditions and domestic situations of individual states. The declaration then 
goes on to recognise “the importance of averting the causes of conflict and of reducing, 
containing and resolving all conflicts by peaceful means, including by customary 
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practices.”124 Finally, while the declaration does not specifically address the possibility of 
armed intervention it provides for a special Forum meeting to “consider other options.”125 
 
There are two key issues with the Biketawa Declaration that effectively divide the Forum 
between the developed nations of Australia and New Zealand and the developing South 
Pacific member states. Firstly, the emerging norm of intervention and good governance can 
be seen as a Western concept to be applied to the developing world, not vice versa.126 The 
Biketawa Declaration was championed by New Zealand and Australia, yet due to the 
established political structures of the two states, neither New Zealand nor Australia were 
likely to be troubled by such guiding principles. This effectively creates a clear divide in the 
Forum between states that have to actively observe the Biketawa principles and those who 
do not. Additionally, the declaration is likely to divide the South Pacific further as it is more 
likely to apply to the politically unstable Melanesian states than to the more stable 
Polynesian and Micronesian regions. The second key sign of division created by Biketawa is a 
contradiction in its wording.   The document claims to maintain and respect the principle of 
non-interference, yet in the following section member states are encouraged to show 
leadership and aid other states as part of the pacific community.127 The issue with this is that 
Biketawa is trying to insist that states will not intervene in other member’s domestic politics, 
and yet it empowers members to intervene in other states domestic politics, albeit 
voluntarily. This not only confuses the role and position of the Forum, it is yet another 
instance where New Zealand and Australia are seen to be drafting policy for the rest of the 
South Pacific. 
 
This principle of intervention contained within Biketawa was first applied in the Solomon 
Islands conflict in 2003. The RAMSI mission showed the South Pacific that economic and 
good governance pressure from New Zealand and Australia had the potential to become an 
invasive threat to a number of South Pacific states. While the situation in the Solomon 
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Islands clearly was an unprecedented humanitarian disaster in the South Pacific and the 
RAMSI force was there under the invitation of the Solomon Islands government and a Forum 
mandate, it can be seen as further polarising the South Pacific by having a force made up of 
predominantly Australian and New Zealand forces, keeping the peace. This fear of 
intervention has not been alleviated with the RAMSI mission lacking a clear exit strategy and 
armed forces still present in 2010.128 
Aside from the RAMSI intervention, New Zealand’s policy direction to the South Pacific has 
followed a similar tone; based on good governance and regionalism in the South Pacific. 
RAMSI can be seen as the most extreme example of this, but there are many other instances 
that are less direct. New Zealand’s aid policy in the early 2000s became increasingly focused 
on improving the way South Pacific states govern, preferably towards a Western democratic 
way.  For example, the 2005 Fiji Background Paper and NZAID/Fiji Country Strategy seeks “to 
strengthen governance, particularly in the areas of public service, law and justice and human 
rights.”129 This focus is mirrored by Australian policy as well as by the European Union 
through the Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) group. 130 The problem with this approach, 
as Pettman notes, is that focussing on good governance can in fact be counterproductive, as 
New Zealand and Australia no longer have a monopoly over access to South Pacific states 
with the region looking more and more towards Asia.131 This shows that New Zealand’s 
strategy towards the region may be out of touch given South Pacific states increasingly have 
other options for financial and political support. 
China, Taiwan and engagement abroad  
While New Zealand had been focussing on improving governance in the South Pacific, the 
PRC had been engaging in a different way. As previously stated, interaction between the PRC 
and the South Pacific became focused on ‘chequebook diplomacy’132: starting with 
diplomatic interaction with Fiji in 1975 and increasing dramatically in the 1990s to fight for 
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international recognition.133 This was a particular sore point for the PRC as it had been 
denied the ‘China seat’ on the United Nations until 1971; 22 years after the PRC established 
control over mainland China.134 Until this point the ROC in Taiwan retained UN membership, 
despite having little or no influence over mainland affairs.135 This conflict over UN 
recognition continued up until 1991 with the ROC attempting to regain UN membership 
under the ‘China’ banner.136 This fight for international recognition, and consequently 
legitimacy as a state, led the two powers to turn to the South Pacific. As all UN member 
states have one vote in the General Assembly, irrespective of size, Pacific states can be seen 
as being disproportionately powerful in the UN. They often have very small populations 
(with the exception of PNG) and very little power in the South Pacific region. This meant 
that, for the least capital, the PRC and the ROC could effectively buy recognition from South 
Pacific leaders. 
This jostling for recognition can characterise the way that the PRC interacted with South 
Pacific states and marks the emergence of the ‘no strings attached’ aid policy.137 Despite 
continual assurances from PRC leaders that ‘aid’ given to the South Pacific was 
unconditional, the underlying requirement was that states were to recognise the ‘one China 
policy’.138 This condition may have been more significant than it seemed as states were to 
recognise either the ROC or the PRC, to the exclusion of the other. This meant that trading 
relationships became very difficult, if not impossible, to develop with the unrecognised 
party, having significant economic implications for South Pacific states. However, in the case 
of Fiji this was not as clear: Suva managed to officially recognise the PRC, while still 
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maintaining its relationship with Taiwan through an unofficial embassy in the Fijian 
capital.139 
Despite the ROC ceasing its attempts to claim the UN ‘China seat’ in 1991, Taiwan had a new 
diplomatic objective: recognition as an independent international actor.140  Somewhat 
surprisingly, this new diplomatic objective did not change the nature of the interactions with 
the South Pacific; in fact it can be seen to have intensified them. Between 1971 and 1991 the 
PRC was attempting to maintain its UN seat and the ROC was attempting to get it back. In 
the 1990s, both economies of the PRC and ROC had developed significantly since diplomatic 
engagements with the Pacific began in the 1970s and as a result the “cheques” to South 
Pacific states were bigger. The Taiwan Straits crisis of 1996 was reflected in the diplomatic 
engagements with the South Pacific as the diplomatic conquest for recognition of ‘one 
China’ or an independent Taiwan increased.  
From a South Pacific perspective, this hunt for recognition could be seen as beneficial for 
poor underdeveloped states. However, such foreign support can only loosely be termed 
‘aid’, because much of the funds were put into ostentatious displays of either China or 
Taiwan’s affection for the state in question and not in traditional aid areas, such as, health, 
education and core infrastructure.141 China has been responsible for the building of a US$2 
million multipurpose sports facility in Fiji as well as a US$5.5 million national sports facility in 
Kiribati.142 Often ROC or PRC funds were allocated to building parliamentary buildings and 
sports centres.143 This approach has not always been seen as positive for South Pacific 
states, particularly in the Solomon Islands where the ROC, in particular, has been criticised 
for effectively prolonging the conflict.144 Even in more peaceful areas of the region, such 
grand gestures by the ROC and PRC have had a number of negative consequences. Primarily, 
such projects were paid for and constructed by the donor using Chinese labour (particularly 
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in the case of the PRC).145 As discussed earlier, this has caused a substantial illegal immigrant 
problem in many South Pacific states, as many foreign labourers remain after construction 
has been completed.146 The second key issue with the China-Taiwan rivalry has been the 
maintenance costs of ROC and PRC projects which are often too high for impoverished states 
to support and so many of these buildings or structures are falling into disrepair. For 
example, the PRC has built a US$12.9 million swimming complex in Samoa that would be 
problematic even for a state the size of New Zealand to maintain.147 
Despite the obvious contest for recognition, the PRC engagement in the South Pacific 
remained on a small scale.  In 1991, a Chinese diplomat told officials in New Zealand that 
South Pacific states were “of little direct importance to China”, even suggesting that the PRC 
embassy in Fiji may be closed down.148 Throughout the 1990s, the PRC seemed to be only 
interested in maintaining its recognition base in the South Pacific and thereby contesting 
Taiwanese power in the region.149 It could be argued that this policy became considerably 
more confident in 1999 and Chinese trade with the region increased 93.6%, mainly due to 
raw materials sourced from PNG and the Solomon Islands.150 At the same time, the PRC built 
an open air stage for the Punanga Nui marketplace, the first of three projects along with the 
construction of two bridges.151 This may be seen as a key turning point for the PRC’s view 
towards the South Pacific, perceiving South Pacific states as a potential source of raw 
materials, rather than simply a battle-ground for recognition.  
This engagement in the South Pacific outside of ‘One China policy’ recognition was 
continued throughout the region. In 2004, the PRC began constructing a US$1.5 million 
Rarotongan courthouse and began planning a $3.7 million police headquarters.152 PRC trade 
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with Tonga, which had been negligible in 1998, had grown so that the PRC was Tonga’s 
second largest export partner and fourth largest import partner by 2004.153 This trend was 
repeated in Fiji with US$250,000 worth of military equipment and stores and US$30,000 
worth of office equipment for the Fijian parliament supplied by the PRC.154 This heightened 
level of engagement with the South Pacific was not only through physical gifts from the PRC, 
but diplomatic engagements also intensified with the heads of state of eight Pacific countries 
visiting Beijing between 2004 and 2005 financially supported by the PRC government.155 By 
2008 the PRC was spending more than twice as much as New Zealand in the South Pacific 
(see appendix one for a detailed breakdown of financial support in 2008).156 
Perhaps the more telling engagements of the PRC in the South Pacific are the improvements 
to resource access in the South Pacific. The region has valuable timber, mineral and fisheries 
assets, all of which have been approached by the PRC.157 The logging imports from the 
Solomon Islands and PNG have already been cited. In terms of fisheries, the PRC has 
developed Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) regarding fishing with the Cook Islands, 
Fiji, Micronesia, Papua New Guinea and, until it changed its policy to recognise the ROC, 
Kiribati.158 In terms of mineral exploitation, the PRC has begun negotiations with PNG over 
potential copper and methanol projects.159 
Thus, PRC interests in the South Pacific have increased, as has speculation over the role the 
PRC plays in the South Pacific, in particular the implications for the stability of the region. 
Australia and New Zealand have increasingly complex aid policies attaching more onerous 
conditions to grants.160 With countries like Australia and New Zealand pushing regional 
instruments such as the Pacific Plan, the seemingly haphazard funding allocation of the PRC 
may be a better option for Pacific states. The potential for instability of the status quo 
appears to come from the three main engagements mentioned above along with the 
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ROC/PRC rivalry. If South Pacific states receive comparatively ‘unconditional’ grants from the 
PRC, they are likely to increasingly accept PRC funds over the condition-bound aid from New 
Zealand and Australia, thereby making instruments like the Pacific Plan less likely to be 
followed.  
Throughout this period, Fiji has stood out from other South Pacific nations in its dealings 
with the PRC and the ROC since its recognition of the PRC in 1975. While other Pacific states 
have been largely committed to the PRC or the ROC or have even in some cases switched 
sides,161 Fiji has officially supported the ‘one China’ model while still having regular 
diplomatic contact with representatives from the ROC. The strategic location of Fiji between 
Polynesia and Melanesia, combined with its relative wealth and the fact that it is home to 
both the University of the South Pacific and the Secretariat of the Pacific Islands Forum, 
means it is a desirable partner in the South Pacific.  By successfully managing its relationship 
with the adversaries, Fiji has managed to receive funding for projects from both the PRC and 
the ROC. 
This relationship has not been entirely positive for the two parties however, with union 
movements in Fiji claiming the influx of Chinese labour has depressed wages and working 
conditions as well as making it more difficult for Fijians to find jobs.162 Furthermore, in such a 
racially divided country, the increased number of Chinese immigrants in Fiji may well lead to 
racially motivated unrest such as the anti Chinese riots in Tonga and the Solomon Islands.163  
The colonial history, fragmented political structure and divided racial society, along with 
Fiji’s strategic location bordering both Polynesia and Melanesia make it a good case study to 
draw conclusions regarding the rest of the South Pacific. New Zealand and China have 
engaged Fiji in a similar manner to other South Pacific states, China through limited 
government engagement and New Zealand in a more comprehensive political relationship. 
While Fiji is far from unique in its colonial history and political unrest in the South Pacific, it is 
a nation divided by ethnicity.164 This divide has emerged for a number of key reasons. Prior 
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to western colonisation, Fiji was effectively a factionalised tribal society with no overarching 
system of national control, individuals acted under the guidance and direction of their local 
chief rather than any federal authority.165 This allegiance was, however, contingent on the 
competency of the chief as a leader and guide and correspondingly, should the chief act 
against the wishes of the people he could be deposed.166 Such action can be seen as an early 
instance of coup d’état by the Fijian populace and is exemplified by numerous cases of chiefs 
being overthrown when they are deemed unworthy by their subjects. Such action is 
enshrined by the Fijian word “Vuaviri” which has a similar meaning to coup d’état.167 Like 
many South Pacific states who say that their political deviances from the Western 
democratic model are the ‘Pacific way’, it seems that physically removing leaders from 
power is part of Fiji’s cultural political structure.168 
With the European colonists came Indians in large numbers who were used as indentured 
labour, causing an ethnic rift in Fiji as the colonists attempted to force the two ethnicities to 
interact with each other peacefully, despite them having completely different beliefs, value 
systems, cultural practices and social aspirations.169 Ethnic Fijians tended to be more 
sociable and engage in subsistence living, growing crops all year round, not needing to 
accumulate resources.  In contrast, the Indian migrants tended to be more insulated and 
focussed on the accumulation of resources, having come from hardship and poverty in 
India.170 Consequently, ethnic Fijians tended to view Indo Fijians as stingy and greedy while, 
Indo Fijians often viewed ethnic Fijians as backward and lazy.171 This division is present today 
and can be seen throughout the South Pacific region with the new Chinese migrants falling 
into the same stereotypes as the Indo Fijians as they buy up local businesses.172 
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With Independence in 1970, ethnic Fijians sought to limit the Indo Fijian influence in society 
by entrenching ethnic Fijian superiority into the constitution, preventing Indo Fijians from 
owning land and sharing equal social and political rights.173 By this stage, Indo Fijians (48.6%) 
slightly outnumbered ethnic Fijians (46.2%).  Despite this, Ratu Mara’s Alliance party 
dominated by ethnic Fijians won the first election in 1972 winning 33 of the 52 seats in 
parliament.174 The general election of 1977 was the first clear indication of constitutional 
uncertainty and a failure of democratic process in Fiji, with the Alliance party defeated by 
the National Federation Party (NFP). This victory meant Siddiq Koya was to be the first Indo-
Fijian prime minister.175 However, the predominantly Indo Fijian party which supported 
equality with ethnic Fijians failed to have enough support to rule alone. This was problematic 
as they could not find another party to ally with to create policy.176  Despite attempts to 
reconcile the crisis, factionalism within the NFP and the Alliance refusing to form a coalition, 
led the Governor-General to use his power to appoint the most suitable government under 
s73 (2) of the 1970 constitution.177 Through this process Ratu Mara for the Alliance was re-
instated as prime minister, as an NFP party would have created ‘instability.’178 This failure to 
honour the election results can be viewed as a failure of democracy in Fiji, as it would appear 
parties only had a mandate to rule if they served ethnic Fijian interests.179 This is further 
illustrated by the head of the Fijian military, Sitiveni Rabuka threatening to resign rather 
than serve an Indo Fijian government for which he felt no loyalty.180 
In 1987 Fiji saw its first change in government since independence in 1970 with the Coalition 
party winning 28 of the 52 seats in the House of Representatives, with the remaining seats 
won by the Alliance.181 The Coalition’s main support group were Indo Fijians, and of the 28 
seats, 19 were filled by Indo Fijians with only 6 seats going to ethnic Fijians.182 Such ethnic 
disparity was not, however, reflected in the cabinet with 6 ethnic Fijians and 7 indo Fijians. 
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Furthermore, all portfolios covering Fijian affairs were held by ethnic Fijians.183 The new 
Prime Minister Bavadra was ethnically Fijian, but a low-ranking chief from the west of Fiji.184 
While the cabinet representation largely reflected the ethnic distribution of the population, 
the ethnic Fijian population felt increasingly dominated by the Indo-Fijian population, for 
example in 1987 there were 12 ethnic-Fijian lawyers to 197 Indo Fijian lawyers in practice.185 
This fear towards the Indo-Fijian population was arguably fostered by the Alliance party who 
asserted that the Coalition was attempting to undermine indigenous Fijian rights, despite 
such rights being entrenched in the constitution. This was exacerbated by the constitution 
not being translated into the Bauan vernacular, meaning many ethnic Fijians were unable to 
read the constitution and understand its provisions.186 Within days of the Bavadra 
government taking office, key Alliance members began protesting the legitimacy of the 
government and claiming that it had a hidden agenda.187 This situation was exacerbated by 
alleged CIA financial support for the ousted party due to the newly elected Prime Minister 
Bavadra’s nuclear-free policy for Fiji.188 At this point the Fijian military, (still led by Rabuka 
who was staunchly ethnic Fijian) was 97% ethnic Fijian. Rabuka expressed a fear the public 
would not support the government and as such the military would have to be called in and 
possibly attack their own people.189 Such insecurity compelled Rabuka to seize power in the 
social interests of ethnic Fijians and the national interests of Fiji.190  
The New Zealand response to the 1987 Rabuka coup must be seen in light of New Zealand’s 
stance towards the South Pacific under the Lange government in the 1980s. New Zealand 
had adopted its nuclear-free position and worked towards a nuclear-free South Pacific 
region. It is unsurprising then, given New Zealand’s increased focus on the South Pacific after 
the Muldoon government, that the May 14 1987 coup was reacted to swiftly by condemning 
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the actions of Rabuka and severing military and development assistance aid.191 What was 
significant was the clear divergence that followed between New Zealand’s policy and that of 
Australia, while both states reacted in the same way following the coup. Australia soon 
realised that sanctioning Fiji would do little to change the political situation and so 
Canberra’s tone became more conciliatory. Conversely, the Lange government in New 
Zealand, rather than attempting to engage with Fiji, began putting in place more political 
conditions for the resumption of aid, even though those political conditions were very 
unlikely to be met.192 This stance shows New Zealand’s transition towards a policy that was 
increasingly independent from Australia in the South Pacific, focussing on good governance 
and democratic values.193 
As a full voting member of the South Pacific Forum during this period, New Zealand 
attempted to use the Forum as a means to pressure Fiji into returning to fair democratic 
rule.194 This policy was however, still undeveloped and the change in government from a 
Labour government to a National government in 1990 sparked a re-think of what were seen 
as some of Lange’s more “radical” policies.195 The political stance New Zealand had taken 
towards Fiji under the Lange government could not be the focus for future foreign policy. As 
a consequence, aerial surveillance under the Driftnet Treaty was to resume over Fijian 
waters with military engagements only to resume after elections had been held.196 
Very little can be said about the PRC response to the 1987 Fiji coup; despite the PRC having 
diplomatic relations with Fiji since 1975, the coup appears to have done little to disrupt 
relations. Fijian Prime Minister Ratu Mara visited Beijing in 1988 just a year after the coup.197 
As the PRC was not heavily involved in the region at the time this lack of a stance towards Fiji 
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surrounding the Rabuka coup is unsurprising, particularly given China’s comparatively 
limited relationship with powerful South Pacific states such as the United States, Australia 
and to a lesser extent New Zealand. 
The overall impact of New Zealand’s stance towards Fiji appears to have been limited. 
Despite the Lange government removing military ties with Fiji as well as development aid, 
the undemocratic government remained until 1992 when elections were held for the first 
time since the military takeover.198 This may have been due in part to a weaker Australian 
position, but it was still clear that New Zealand was unable to directly influence the regime 
of a South Pacific state through sanctions and tough words alone.  
The 1999 general election in Fiji saw the majority elect a party with an Indo Fijian majority. 
Once again, rhetoric was used alleging an Indo Fijian plot to remove ethnic Fijian supremacy 
and change the constitution to allow Indo Fijians to buy land.199 This apparent shift in power 
between ethnic groups was seen as compelling a group of lower ranking members of the 
military (in particular Rabuka’s Counter Revolutionary Unit) alongside ethnic Fijian business 
owners to re-assert ethnic Fijian dominance.200 During this time, the democratically elected 
Chaudhry government was held hostage in the parliamentary buildings for 56 days. 
Throughout this period, uncertainty over who was running the country and how the crisis 
could be resolved resulted in spates of civil disorder and increasing distrust, not only by the 
public and military, but also between those involved in orchestrating the coup.201 
The New Zealand response to the 2000 Speight coup was like that of David Lange in 1987. 
The Clark government began by criticising the unlawful seizure of power and supported the 
immediate reinstatement of the democratically elected leader, Mahendra Chaudhry.202 New 
Zealand then went further to criticise the Fijian Great Council of Chiefs for replacing the 
Chaudhry government with an interim administration.203 Once again, like the Lange 
government in 1987, Clark rapidly accepted that the situation in Fiji was unlikely to be 
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resolved through words and military ties were severed along with a ban on people 
associated with Speight entering New Zealand.204 One of the key differences and a sign that 
New Zealand policy was changing towards the South Pacific and Fiji, in particular, was the 
decision to bypass the Pacific Islands Forum and put in place travel and military cooperation 
sanctions without Forum approval or an established Forum position on the Speight coup.205 
While Lange had attempted to use the Forum to develop a coherent policy on political 
instability in the South Pacific, Clark was insistent that the Forum needed to develop a 
position that protected democratic rights in the South Pacific, thus the Biketawa Declaration 
was drafted to be put up for voting at the October 2000 Forum meeting.206 
The response by Australia and New Zealand to the 2000 coup can be explained by a number 
of key factors. Firstly, the failure of the Lange government’s sanctions against the 1987 coup 
meant that New Zealand was likely to apply more pressure on Fiji and avoid the Pacific 
Islands Forum as a means for a joint plan towards Fiji. Secondly, opinion across the Tasman 
had changed towards the South Pacific: under the Howard government, Melanesian 
instability was seen as a threat to Australian security and, rather than adopting an 
engagement strategy, Howard focused on a containment plan.207 This provided a more 
united front for New Zealand to work from and a more coherent policy approach. 
In contrast to the New Zealand response to the 2000 Fiji coup, the PRC did not place 
sanctions on Fiji or actively criticise the Speight takeover of power. China was focussed on its 
diplomatic rivalry with the ROC, the domestic politics of Fiji were largely irrelevant to their 
interests in Fiji and the region.208 This approach was commended by the Fijian Prime 
Minister Laisenia Qarase in 2002 after a visit to China, who praised the PRC government for 
not imposing sanctions after the previous Fiji coups.209 Despite being considerably more 
active in the South Pacific in 2000, the PRC was still not willing to proactively address 
instability in the South Pacific. This is not altogether unreasonable, the PRC has a very 
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different political structure to New Zealand and as such, is unlikely to support a return to 
democracy in the South Pacific when the PRC does not have a democratic government itself.   
The 1st Ministerial Conference of China Pacific Island Countries Economic 
Development and Cooperation Forum  
The regional importance of Fiji made it the most logical place for the April 2006 1st 
Ministerial Conference of China Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and 
Cooperation Forum held in Suva. This meeting can be seen as a turning point in PRC-South 
Pacific relations as well as Sino-Fijian relations. The conference sought to affirm and improve 
relations between the PRC and the Pacific, through economic and diplomatic cooperation.  
This meeting was also the first time the PRC clearly defined the relationship it had with 
South Pacific states and cast a degree of doubt over the ever-present claims that China gave 
aid with “no strings attached.”210 In the opening speech of the conference Premier Wen set 
out the relationship between island states and the PRC: 
 
As a Chinese saying puts it, "Just as distance tests a horse's strength, time will show a 
person's sincerity." As far as China is concerned, to foster friendship and cooperation 
with the Pacific island countries is not a diplomatic expediency. Rather, it is a strategic 
decision. China has proved and will continue to prove itself to be a sincere, 
trustworthy and reliable friend and partner of the Pacific island countries forever.211 
 
This statement, along with the rest of the rhetoric used in Premier Wen’s speech of “equals” 
and “friends”, claims that the money the PRC was giving the Pacific was not a hand-out or 
‘aid’, but a mutually beneficial transaction. Wen stated "China has funding and technical 
expertise. The island countries are rich in natural resources."212 While raw materials are 
important to the PRC, this comment needs to viewed in the context of PRC-ROC rivalry. In 
July 2006, Chinese Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, He Yafei, told the New Zealand 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade that Taiwan’s actions in the region were 
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destabilising.213 China was attempting to promote economic and socially-sustainable 
development, something that was being undermined by the ROC in the South Pacific.214 This 
was shown with the allocation of nearly NZ$600 million in preferential loans to encourage 
greater cooperation in resource development, in particular agriculture, forestry, fishing, 
tourism, textiles, consumer products manufacturing, telecommunications, aviation and 
ocean shipping.215 This commitment can be seen as a clear example of China setting itself up 
for resource exploitation in the South Pacific. The funds allocated for this are not grants but 
“soft loans”, the South Pacific is getting into debt in order to finance resource exploitation 
that will benefit the PRC (see appendix one for a detailed breakdown of financial support in 
2008).216 However, these are ‘soft loans’ with the implication that they will be written off 
over time, and also the economies of South Pacific states may benefit from such activities.  
 
The conference revealed a number of other policies that appear to be more in the South 
Pacific states’ favour. China “pledged to give zero tariff treatment to the majority of exports 
to China from the least developed countries in the region that have diplomatic ties with 
China.” ‘Diplomatic ties’ may be read as ‘states that support the one China policy.217 In terms 
of healthcare, China would commit to providing free anti-malaria medicines to affected 
states as well as engaging in further training exercises with South Pacific medical 
practitioners.218 Furthermore, China would commit to provide training for 2000 government 
and technical staff to assist in capacity building.219 Perhaps one of the more significant 
outcomes of the meeting was the approval of PNG, Samoa and the Federated States of 
Micronesia as approved destinations for Chinese tourists  and consequently, including all 
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states that recognise the PRC in this Approved Destination Status (ADS) agreement.220 This is 
significant as many South Pacific states have economies that are reliant on tourism and the 
potential benefits of such a scheme are considerable.  
 
So overall, the 1st Ministerial Conference of China Pacific Island Countries Economic 
Development and Cooperation Forum can be viewed as the clearest statement of intent that 
the PRC has for the region. The South Pacific nations who recognise the PRC are to be 
treated as an equal to China and will benefit from such a relationship. With this equality the 
PRC is effectively guaranteeing resources for Chinese manufacturing and Chinese consumers. 
Furthermore, despite conditionality for a number of the commitments being based on 
recognition of the ‘one China’ policy, competing diplomatically with Taiwan can no longer be 
seen as the sole reason for Chinese interactions with South Pacific states. PRC policy in Africa 
is a similar example of where resources are becoming a supplementary benefit for China-
ROC rivalry.221 In fact, the 2006 Forum on Africa-China Cooperation (FOCAC) summit strongly 
mirrored the 1st Ministerial Conference in the South Pacific.222 Chinese demand for raw 
materials and a desire to be seen as a responsible international actor have meant that their 
interactions with developing states have become more than chequebook diplomacy.223 
 
In conclusion, New Zealand and the PRC have developed very different approaches towards 
the South Pacific due to a number of factors:  the motivations of the two sides, the political 
and power constraints of the two nations as well as their relations with other powerful 
states in the region and the South Pacific states themselves have caused them to view the 
region in different ways. New Zealand has clearly developed a policy of improving and 
entrenching good governance and democratic values in the South Pacific, pushing this 
agenda even if it is unlikely to directly change the political situation in South Pacific states. 
Meanwhile, the PRC has been, until recently, predominantly devoted to a battle over 
recognition with Taiwan in the South Pacific, and has only in the last ten years really started 
seeing the potential of other resources in the South Pacific that may be exploited. It seems 
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that the PRC is looking to increase its ties with the South Pacific diplomatically and 
strategically which has the potential to disrupt the traditional role New Zealand has played in 
the region.  The following chapter discusses how these two seemingly independent 
objectives clash when New Zealand attempts to pressure Fiji financially and politically to 
hold elections, while the PRC increases funding and political cooperation to secure Fijian 
resources and its strategic position.  
 41 
 
Chapter three: Unilateral responses 
to the 2006 Fiji coup 
The 2006 Fiji coup was the fourth since independence for the Melanesian State. Both New 
Zealand and the PRC have significant interests in Fiji, so any political upheaval or instability in 
Fiji and the South Pacific region has to be seen as potentially impacting upon those interests. 
This chapter looks at the unilateral responses by both New Zealand and the PRC to the 2006 
coup immediately following the seizure of power in 2006 up until the end of 2010. The direct 
and indirect policies and approaches to Fiji are assessed based on the implications for New 
Zealand, the PRC, Fiji and the wider region. While New Zealand adopted a hard line approach 
to pressure the Fijian government to hold democratic elections, the PRC continued to 
engage and enhance its relations with Fiji as it had done before the 2006 coup.  
The 2006 Fiji Coup 
Signals suggesting a coup d’état orchestrated by Bainimarama could take place can be 
identified as early as the 2001 Fijian general election. Despite Bainimarama appointing 
Qarase as interim Prime Minister following the 2000 coup, the relationship between the two 
men began to sour with   revelations that the Fijian Ministry of Agriculture used millions of 
tax payer funds to effectively buy votes in the 2001 general election through affirmative 
action policies.224 As a strong anti corruption critic, Bainimarama was further troubled by 
Qarase’s appointment of Qoriniasi Bale in the position of Attorney-General as Bale had 
previously been disbarred for trust fund misappropriation a few years earlier.225 This division 
between the military and Qarase’s government increased in the years leading up to the 2006 
coup. In 2004, Bainimarama directly pressured the Prime Minister and President to reverse a 
government order to reduce the sentence of four military officials involved in a mutiny in 
November 2000.226 This issue was of a personal nature to Bainimarama: firstly, because he 
was nearly killed in the conflict and secondly (and perhaps more importantly), during 
Bainimarama’s suppression of the mutiny three rebel soldiers were brutally killed by Fijian 
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military forces.227 By keeping these men in jail Bainimarama was deflecting culpability for the 
events surrounding the November 2000 mutiny. 
 Two key pieces of legislation stand out as turning points for the way Bainimarama viewed 
Qarase, the Promotion of Reconciliation, Tolerance and Unity Bill (PRTU) and the Qoliqoli 
Bill. The PRTU was ostensibly set up to apply restorative justice practices to the cases of a 
number of those responsible for the 2000 coup.228 This legislation was seen by its supporters 
as a means to repair some of the damage done by the 2000 coup and to prevent further 
human rights violations from occurring in Fiji.229 To Bainimarama and critics of the Bill, this 
was seen as an attempt to let those involved in the coup off before they had served 
appropriate sentences for their actions230. This feeling was compounded by the conviction 
and sentencing of coup conspirators being viewed as inequitable. Many of the instrumental 
figures arguably responsible for the coup were let off with small sentences, for example, 
Ratu Inoke Kubuabola was posted to Malaysia as the Fijian High Commissioner despite being 
an important figure in the 2000 coup.231 The second Bill, that was seen by the military and 
many others (such as tourist operators) as being detrimental for Fiji, was the Qoliqoli Bill 
granting native rights to the area between the foreshore and the high water mark.232 This 
area would be available for the unfettered use and enjoyment of the resource owners, who 
happened to be ethnic Fijians.233 This meant substantial fishing and access rights would be 
released from crown ownership. Unsurprisingly, criticism was levelled at the government not 
only for giving away such a valuable crown resource, but also because this would lead to a 
potential collapse of the tourist industry that relied on access to these areas, not to mention 
the further entrenchment of divisions between ethnic and Indo Fijians.234 What these two 
Bills did is effectively alienate the public from the government and align them with the 
military. Corruption was clear through numerous government embarrassments relayed in 
the media and the poorly-drafted and seemingly-damaging legislation also distanced the 
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public from the government.235 The military, on the other hand, was asking for what the 
people wanted, a more transparent government and one that acted in the long term 
interests of Fiji. 
Prior to the 2006 Fijian general election, it was clear that Bainimarama was becoming 
increasingly displeased with the Qarase administration. The military was sent to villages by 
Bainimarama to actively campaign against the government.236 This policy was attacked by 
Qarase saying that it was not the role of Bainimarama or the military to influence the 
democratic election process in Fiji.237 Eventually, a truce was called by the Vice-President 
Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi in January 2006 but this was short-lived, being broken only a few 
months later when Bainimarama returned to the campaign trail after allegations Qarase was 
attempting to have him replaced.238  In May 2006, the day Parliament was dissolved, 500 
RFMF soldiers marched the streets of Suva dressed in full battle gear, another key sign that 
the military held the true power in Fiji.239 
The 2006 general election saw Qarase’s SDL party returned to power with 36 of the 71 seats, 
with the FLP winning 31 seats. This division reflected the racial divides in Fiji as 80% of ethnic 
Fijians voted for the SDL, while 83% of Indo Fijians voted for the FLP. Once again, Fiji was 
shown to be politically divided down the middle. Given this clear ethnic and political rift in 
Fiji, Qarase surprised many commentators by attempting to put together a multi-party 
cabinet made up of both the SDL and FLP. Furthermore, high profile Ministries such as 
Agriculture, Trade and Commerce were offered to the FLP. This may be seen as an attempt 
to unify the government with the overarching threat of the RFMF looming over Qarase.  The 
proposition was not initially welcomed by the FLP with leader Chaudhry sceptical of the 
move and insisting that he should be able to choose the members for the portfolios offered. 
Adding to the confusion over the way the multi-party Cabinet would work, Chaudhry then 
attempted to be made the leader of the opposition, despite his own party members holding 
cabinet positions in the government.  
                                                          
235
 ———, ed. The 2006 Military Takeover in Fiji: A Coup to End All Coups? (Australian National University 
Press,2009). 25 
236
 Ibid. 25 
237
 Ibid. 25 
238
 Ibid. 
239
 "Military show of force no comfort for Fiji," Fiji Sun, 28/03/2006. 
 44 
 
The makeup of the multi-party cabinet was soon untenable, as Chaudhry held back from 
truly engaging and Qarase failed to actually decide on the way the multi-party cabinet would 
work. Even though Qarase attempted to reduce tensions by including FLP leaders in the 
government, a number of controversial people were put in high profile positions, most 
notably Ratu Naiqama Lalabalavu who was appointed as Minister of Fijian Affairs, despite 
being convicted for inciting mutiny in the 2000 coup.240 Additionally, Land Forces 
Commander Jone Baledrokadroka was shortlisted for the role of Commissioner of Prisons, 
even though he had been dismissed from the RFMF and was facing charges of 
insubordination and indiscipline after an attempt to overthrow Bainimarama in January 
2006.241 Despite creating a multi-party cabinet Qarase was intent on passing the 
controversial PRTU and Qoliqoli Bills both of which had been heavily criticised by the FLP in 
the lead up to the 2006 election.  
Not only had Qarase appointed people to cabinet that Bainimarama had personal and 
professional grievances with, he had also continued to attempt to pass legislation that 
Bainimarama did not believe in and had actively campaigned against.242 All of this pushed 
Bainimarama further and further away from the government. In October 2006, Bainimarama 
announced that the government had three weeks to change its behaviour or resign as he left 
for a tour of Fijian peacekeepers in the Middle East.243 Rather than easing the tensions with 
the RFMF, the government made its position worse by attempting to remove Bainimarama 
while he was out of the country. This attempt failed as RFMF soldiers backed the 
Commodore and not only consolidated Bainimarama’s control over the RFMF, but also 
further distanced the Fijian public from the government.244 Such tactics were seen as 
underhanded, particularly given that Bainimarama had a dedicated following and increasing 
public support. While the relationship between the military and the government was 
deteriorating, the Police force began aligning itself with the government, with the 
Commissioner of Police, Andrew Hughes alleging Bainimarama was accountable for a raft of 
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offences, including seditious comments, and illegally preventing a commission of enquiry 
over the November 2000 mutiny.245  
By November 2006, Bainimarama was ‘non negotiable’ in his demands that the police drop 
any investigations over the 2000 mutiny as well as demanding a host of other concessions 
from the government and police.246 On the 29th November 2006, New Zealand attempted to 
break the impasse with Helen Clark using Bainimarama’s personal visit to New Zealand as an 
opportunity for mediation between Bainimarama and Qarase.247 During this meeting Qarase 
gave in to almost all of Bainimarama’s demands,248 whether he intended to actually put 
these into action remains up for speculation as Bainimarama reneged on the deal as soon as 
he returned to Fiji.249 By this stage, strategic military and government assets around the 
country had been secured and the military had unfettered access to the Fijian President. The 
coup planning was all but complete and at 6pm on 5 December 2006 Bainimarama declared 
that he had assumed power claiming that “circumstances forced us to take control.”250 
New Zealand’s Response to the 2006 Fiji Coup 
New Zealand made an attempt to resolve the conflict between Bainimarama and Qarase in 
November before the coup took place, a meeting which appeared to have resolved much of 
the tension through Qarase’s concessions.251 New Zealand’s rapid and decisive responses to 
the previous coups, combined with New Zealand’s increasingly interventionist role in the 
South Pacific through the implementation of the Biketawa declaration and the RAMSI 
intervention made New Zealand’s response to the coup almost predictable.252 The Clark 
government along with the Howard government in Australia had become increasingly 
concerned about instability in Melanesia destabilising the entire South Pacific region.253 This 
view was compounded by arms trafficking between the conflicts in Bougainville, the 
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Solomon Islands and East Timor.254 It was with this perspective that Howard and Clark 
viewed the political instability of one Melanesian state to be a threat to the entire region 
and to New Zealand and Australian interests in the region.255 
On the 5th of December 2006 Wellington announced a “wide range of sanctions” for Fiji and 
extended those sanctions on the 6th of December 2006.256 This immediate political response 
to the coup was somewhat unsurprising given the aforementioned premeditated nature of 
Bainimarama’s move to seize power.257  The unilateral sanctions imposed by New Zealand 
strongly resembled those of the Australian government. This similarity reflected the unified 
approach New Zealand and Australia had begun to take towards Melanesia and the South 
Pacific. These covered the following areas: high level ministerial and government contacts, 
immigration and travel bans, defence ties, sporting contacts and development assistance.258 
Firstly, ministerial contact between New Zealand and Fiji would be limited to mediation and 
dialogue and members of the new government were banned from travelling to New 
Zealand.259 Secondly, no RFMF members, their families or any other individuals connected 
with the coup would be able to travel to New Zealand. All seasonal working agreements that 
were currently being undertaken would be stopped for Fijian citizens and no new 
applications could be made for Fijians.260 Any members of the RFMF currently in New 
Zealand would be prevented from furthering any training and would be required to leave the 
country immediately.261 All sporting contact would be severed between New Zealand and Fiji 
unless international competition rules or legal rules required Fijian participation regardless 
of the level of sport.262 Finally, development assistance that had previously been 
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administered through the Fijian government would be redirected through Non 
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) operating in Fiji rather than through the Fijian state.263 
Not only was the policy condemning the actions of the coup leaders clear, the wording 
suggests that the Clark government took the coup extremely seriously. 
The New Zealand Government cannot overstate the severity with which it views the 
actions of Commodore Bainimarama and the Fiji military. They must cease their 
disgraceful acts and restore the legitimately elected government, or suffer the 
consequences of their grossly illegal acts.264 
The message from New Zealand was extremely clear, Fiji was to return to democratic rule by 
holding fair and open elections or it would continue to face strict sanctions from New 
Zealand and risk further diplomatic and financial loss. While this statement was 
predominantly meant to be directed at the Bainimarama administration, it was likely to also 
impact upon those Fijians who were not in any way associated with the coup itself.265 For 
example, the restrictions on sports teams from visiting New Zealand. This was not limited to 
teams playing under the Fiji banner but also smaller regional teams were excluded from 
visiting New Zealand.266 This can also be seen in the restrictions placed on the seasonal 
migrant scheme. Fijians who would have previously been eligible to work in New Zealand 
under the scheme and had nothing to do with the coup or those responsible were prevented 
from coming to New Zealand to work.267 The apparent reason for this punishment of those 
not involved in the coup was to compel the people of Fiji to rise up against this ‘illegal’ 
change in government and in so doing receive the benefits from New Zealand once again.268 
The immediate impact of the December 5 unilateral sanctions drew considerable criticism 
from NGO groups as well as important sporting groups and business leaders. On the 7 
December 2006 the Coalition for Democracy and Peace, a group of NGOs condemned the 
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Clark government’s decision to impose sanctions upon Fiji.269 The Coalition argued that 
removing scholarships and seasonal worker schemes to Fijians did little to impact upon the 
military government, instead such sanctions hurt ordinary Fijians who were already worse 
off because of the political instability, subsequent rises in Value Added Tax (VAT) and the 
privatisation of Fiji’s water supplies.270 The Fiji Retailers Association commented that the ban 
on seasonal workers would harm unemployed Fijians who were in no way involved with 
coup activities.271 Furthermore, trading sanctions would hurt retailers and Fijian industry 
more than it would impact upon the government.272The leading Fijian sports administrative 
body SASANOC also criticised the sanctions claiming that Fijian athletes did not stage the 
coup and were being unfairly punished for something that was out of their control.273 Clark 
responded to this criticism, saying that the sporting sanctions were put in place specifically 
because sport was so important to the Fijian people.274 To deal with NGO criticism, it was 
reiterated that aid was not going to be cut to Fiji but be redirected through NGOs rather 
than through the military administration.275  
It was a deliberate decision by the Clark government to target a number of groups and 
individuals who were not in any way involved in or responsible for the 2006 coup.276 This 
was allegedly in order to encourage an uprising against the Bainimarama government. If the 
people suffered from hardship, such as being unable to represent their country or region in 
New Zealand sporting competitions or be prevented from being employed under the 
migrant worker scheme, they would hold the Fijian government responsible and then 
attempt to affect a change in government. At least that appeared to be the theory behind 
the policy. However, the Fijian government characterised this move as an unreasonable and 
unwarranted punishment of the Fijian people by the New Zealand government. The NGO 
and local business group criticism of the New Zealand government’s sanctioning of the 
‘innocent population’ effectively gave credibility to Bainimarama’s claims that outside 
powers such as New Zealand were unfairly treating Fiji. Despite infrequent and small 
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protests against the Bainimarama government following the coup, little public reaction 
appears to have taken place because of the Clark government’s policy. This may be 
explained in two ways. Firstly, it may be viewed as a successful characterisation by 
Bainimarama that the policy was the act of an outside power that did not understand Fiji’s 
problems. Alternatively the policy may have had little real impact on everyday Fijians, or at 
least not enough of an impact to motivate them to rise up against the Bainimarama 
government. Either way, the policy appears to have failed to pressure Fijian’s to protest and 
risked being used to undermine New Zealand’s condemnation of Fiji following the coup. 
While the sanctioning of those uninvolved with the coup may have been a short term policy 
goal, the impact New Zealand’s other unilateral sanctions had on the Bainimarama 
administration and the people of Fiji have to be viewed in the context that they were not 
intended to create immediate change in the Fijian political situation. Foreign Minister 
Winston Peters stated that the sanctions would be effective in the long term as the 
international community rallied behind New Zealand and adopted similar stances towards 
Fiji.277 New Zealand was relying on unified international condemnation pressuring Fiji to 
return to democratic rule. Despite the long term aim of the sanctions the relationship 
between the Clark government and the Bainimarama administration was chilly from the 
outset. The unilateral sanctions and surrounding rhetoric of the New Zealand government 
clearly signalled that the sanctions were to remain until ‘free and fair’ democratic elections 
took place.278 This position was exemplified when the former President of Fiji was returned 
to power by the Fiji military in January 2007 following the coup. Acting Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Ruth Dyson’s stated confirmation that executive authority in Fiji rests with the 
President does not, on its own, satisfy the many international and regional calls for 
restoration of democracy and fundamental freedoms in Fiji.279 
Despite exchanges of political rhetoric surrounding New Zealand’s unilateral sanctions on 
Fiji, little demonstrable change was seen in the Fijian situation until June 2007, with the 
expulsion of New Zealand’s High Commissioner to Fiji Michael Green.280 This conflict arose 
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amidst allegations that Green was attempting to undermine the military administration.281 
Bainimarama insisted that this was an issue concerning Green and not the New Zealand 
government, as he was happy for another Commissioner to be appointed in the usual 
manner.282 Such a statement appears to have been somewhat tenuous as Bainimarama then 
went on to criticise the New Zealand government for ‘snubbing’ the Fijian High 
Commissioner in Wellington and failing to engage with the Fijian government in his 
announcement that Green was to leave Fiji.283 The Clark government clearly viewed the 
expulsion of Green as a political move against the New Zealand Government and not against 
Green as an individual. Foreign Minister Winston Peters stated that Green was acting under 
New Zealand government orders in all his duties in Fiji and any action to remove Green was 
“completely unjustifiable.”284 Peters went on to say that the Bainimarama government 
ought to “expect a strong reaction” from New Zealand and that increased flexibility in 
existing sanctions such as the contentious visa ban was very unlikely given Green’s 
expulsion.285 This threat was reiterated by Clark saying, “what Fiji has done is a serious and 
significant act. Our response must be serious and significant...”286 Clark went on to suggest 
that this “lashing out” from Fiji was likely to be due to the “very severe pressure the regime 
has been put under.”287 The New Zealand government were using Green’s expulsion as 
evidence not only that New Zealand’s policies were being effective towards Fiji, but also that 
the Bainimarama government would face further punishment for its actions. 
Despite such rhetoric claiming that further unilateral measures would be taken against Fiji, 
no substantive new sanctions were put in place following Green’s expulsion. This is likely to 
be due to the hard line that the Clark government had taken with its sanctions in December 
2006. Little room was left for New Zealand to intensify its existing sanctions or create new 
unilateral sanctions to impact upon Fiji. The measures taken by the Clark government appear 
to cover almost all of New Zealand’s unilateral ties with the Fijian State. New Zealand’s close 
sporting relationship with Fiji, its relationship as a benefactor to Fiji through aid and the 
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Seasonal Migrant Scheme as well as restricting travel for the military, many of whom have 
family who reside in New Zealand.288 Consequently, it is difficult to see how these sanctions 
could be extended; it is possible that the government did not believe it could increase its 
unilateral exclusion of Fiji despite its strong rhetoric. Winston Peters’ comment that “In such 
circumstances it is difficult to see how we can be expected to show flexibility on issues such 
as the visa ban”, suggests that rather than actually putting in place new sanctions, New 
Zealand would just maintain its existing policy towards Fiji. 
This failure to further punish Fiji with new or more onerous unilateral sanctions effectively 
continued up until the 2008 New Zealand General Election. To some degree, this can be 
explained by the multilateral and external influence New Zealand was attempting to exert on 
Fiji (discussed in chapter four). Because at this stage the Bainimarama government was 
committing itself to hold democratic elections in 2009, it is understandable that even if this 
statement was not seen as entirely credible by New Zealand, it could be interpreted as Fiji 
responding to international pressure from New Zealand and other actors. Furthermore, even 
if New Zealand did not take the promises of Bainimarama to hold elections seriously, it is 
unlikely that other regional actors would agree to a tougher line against Bainimarama given 
that he had committed to hold democratic elections within the given timeframe.289 
2008-2010 The impact of New Zealand’s unilateral sanctions under the Key 
government 
The November 2008 election saw the incumbent Labour coalition ousted and replaced by a 
National coalition government led by National Party leader John Key.  The ‘Fiji issue’ was on 
the agenda shortly after the election with the new Minister of Foreign Affairs Murray 
McCully insisting that New Zealand would put renewed pressure on Fiji to hold democratic 
elections.290 This initial phase of policy development and interaction with Bainimarama and 
Fiji can be seen as ‘testing the waters’, particularly given that the National Party had to work 
with the previous government’s policy of exclusion towards Fiji. In the lead up to the 2008 
election the National Party signalled a number of important changes from the previous 
Labour party, including sweeping reforms of the aid and foreign affairs sector indicating the 
Clark government’s Fiji policy may be changed. Bainimarama was quick to push for the 
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National coalition to reveal their policy towards Fiji and assess their commitment to the 
Clark government’s position on sanctions. 
The National Party coalition’s unilateral policy direction towards Fiji was substantiated in 
December 2008 with New Zealand’s acting Commissioner to Fiji Caroline McDonald expelled 
from Fiji.291 This action was taken after a meeting between Bainimarama and McCully where 
McCully suggested that travel bans could be relaxed.292 Bainimarama then threatened that 
travel bans must be removed or the acting New Zealand High Commissioner would be 
expelled from Fiji.293 It seems Bainimarama was attempting to see how the new National 
coalition would react to a changing situation in Fiji. McCully responded to the news of 
McDonald’s expulsion saying that “such an action would be a further setback to the prospect 
of improving relations between New Zealand and Fiji and would carry consequences that 
would risk further damage to the relationship.”294 McCully went on to assert that “the 
incoming National Government is intent upon improving relations between New Zealand 
and Fiji, and looks forward to the opportunity to relax progressively the sanctions currently 
in place.”295 This shows a slight but clear change from the policy of the Clark government. 
While under Clark the sanctions put in place were not negotiable until democratic elections 
had taken place, McCully signalled that under the Key government sanctions could be lifted 
progressively as progress towards democracy was made.  Once again though, leniency was 
voiced as an option but not implemented in formal policy. 
Such an interaction between Bainimarama and the Key government may be viewed as the 
two sides exploring the parameters. McCully indicates that a more relaxed policy approach 
will be taken by the National coalition and Bainimarama attempts to use this opportunity to 
pressure New Zealand to increase its concessions towards Fiji. Much of Bainimarama’s 
criticism responding to McCully’s failure to relax sanctions relates more to the actions of the 
Clark government than to that of McCully. “Your mission in Suva over the past 18 months 
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has served no role in improving relations with Fiji.”296 Bainimarama’s rhetoric is similar to 
that used criticising the Clark government.  He describes the National government as 
“employing bully boy tactics”297 much the same as his description of Clark as attempting to 
be the “lady of the Pacific.”298 Bainimarama rounds off by saying that “The ball is in your 
court to improve relations with Fiji.”299 Despite the change in government to the Key 
administration, Bainimarama alleged that the policy direction of the New Zealand 
government in the region was the same. 
 
So from the start of the National coalition’s term in office, Fiji was a major foreign policy 
issue to be dealt with. The actual changes in unilateral policy towards Fiji have been subtle 
but important (significant regional policy decisions are addressed in chapter four). In April 
2009 Fiji was once again involved in a constitutional crisis where the Fijian constitution was 
abrogated, key members of the judiciary were sacked and restrictive emergency regulations 
were placed on the media and other powerful organisations.300 While the National 
government condemned this action it clearly stated that no further unilateral sanctions 
would be imposed upon Fiji. McCully even went so far as to announce that the sporting 
sanctions imposed by the Clark government had been relaxed only a month after the 
constitutional crisis took place.301 As with much of the Key government’s policy towards Fiji, 
this relaxing of sanctions was done quietly.  Key went on to say that “New Zealand was 
prepared to have talks with Fiji when Bainimarama was willing to cooperate.”302  
Throughout 2009 McCully made it clear that the hard line policies towards Fiji were drafted 
by the previous government and did not always reflect the policy direction of the National 
Party coalition.303 Following the initial ‘crisis’ policy or reactionary politics surrounding the 
expulsion of McDonald, the National party coalition government was able to create its own 
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unilateral approach to Fiji that deviated from the policy of the previous Clark government. In 
a meeting with the Fiji-NZ Business Council in September 2009 McCully explained that while 
the majority of sanctions were “highly effective,” flexibility would be applied to sporting 
sanctions as the National coalition “wanted to avoid punishing innocent, and generally 
young, Fijian nationals who carry no responsibility for the actions of their government.”304 
McCully went on to say that New Zealand “cannot force Fiji to embrace democracy” but the 
unpredictable and unstable regime was likely to isolate Fiji from the international 
community.305 While such statements appear to show only minimal flexibility towards the 
Fijian regime in unilateral engagement, it is unlikely such concessions (however small) would 
have taken place under a Clark government. 
Overall, apart from the direct unilateral sanctioning of Fiji following the coup, the rift 
between the New Zealand Government and Fiji became more of a verbal conflict. Both 
parties suggested that they were open to engagement with the other party so long as their 
terms and conditions were met. Under the initial sanctions, engagement for mediation 
purposes was still provided for and the National government suggested they were willing to 
talk to Bainimarama. This sentiment was repeated by Fiji with Bainimarama claiming that he 
was happy to engage with Clark and later McCully “diplomatically, on a level playing field, 
with dignity and civility, professionalism and honesty with the view to put in place systems 
for sustained parliamentary democracy.”306 With both sides claiming they were ready to 
engage with one another such words can be seen as an attempt to be viewed as the 
‘reasonable’ party in the conflict.  
The PRC Unilateral Response to the Fiji coup 
As mentioned in chapter two, when examining PRC relations with other states, in particular 
unstable states, the PRC is unlikely to condemn or condone the domestic political situation 
of foreign states unless the issue of PRC recognition is concerned, this has been well 
established with Beijing’s policy of non-interference.307 In the case of Fiji it is important to 
                                                          
304
 Ibid. 
305
 Ibid. 
306
 J Bainimarama, "Correspondence between Bainamarama, J and McCully, M,"  
http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Media-and-publications/Features/930-NZ-High-Commissioner-to-Fiji.php. 
307
 Terrence Wesley-Smith, "China in Oceania: New Forces in Pacific Politics," in Pacific Islands Policy (Honolulu: 
East West Centre, 2007). 3 see also "China's Independent Foreign Policy of Peace,"  
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/wjzc/t24881.htm. 
 55 
 
look not only at the way the PRC has reached out towards Fiji but also how Fiji has reached 
out towards the PRC, publicly stating that the PRC is a better ‘friend’ to Fiji than its 
traditional allies New Zealand and Australia.308 Meanwhile, the PRC has a strong demand for 
raw materials and political capital as well as other financial goals in the South Pacific 
reflected by an increase in trade between the PRC and the region from US$180 million in 
2001 to more than US$2.1 billion in 2008 with an annual growth rate of 32.3 percent.309 The 
combination of a desire for Fiji to diversify its foreign relations and a desire for the PRC to 
become more involved in the South Pacific appears to have made greater engagement 
between the PRC and the Bainimarama government almost inevitable.  
While there is strong evidence that the PRC has been actively engaging with Fiji and the 
Bainimarama regime, Bainimarama has also been actively and vocally characterising the PRC 
as a replacement power given the sanctions imposed by Australia and New Zealand 
following the coup. This approach by the interim Fijian regime has been termed the Look 
North policy, whereby Fiji will actively seek stronger ties with the PRC and other more 
‘likeminded’ states.310  Rather than seeking a replacement for New Zealand and Australia 
Bainimarama claimed that Fiji had been forced to look elsewhere to “compensate what Fiji 
had lost.”311 The sanctions imposed by Australia and New Zealand had forced Fiji to 
proactively seek out support from elsewhere to make up for the sanctions. Furthermore 
Bainimarama claimed that the PRC understood the Fijian situation better than Australia and 
New Zealand saying that China “is the only nation that can help assist Fiji in its reforms 
because of the way the Chinese think.”312 Given the fact that the PRC does not have the 
same focus instilling and improving the democratic governance of its international partners 
it is unsurprising that the coup response was not critical of the act but rather the instability it 
caused.  
As with the previous Fiji coups there was no explicit PRC response condoning or condemning 
the 2006 coup. Instead, on the 7th of December 2006 Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang 
delivered the following statement: "We are closely following developments in Fiji, and hope 
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that related parties can find a way to appropriately solve differences and problems, and 
realise stability.”313 By calling for stability and reconciliation the PRC was not necessarily 
criticising the coup itself, but rather the instability that the coup had caused in Fiji. It is 
unlikely that the PRC would condemn the actions of coup leaders given its position as a 
single party non-democratic state. Furthermore, Beijing does not follow the same 
conditionality of good governance and democratic values that New Zealand does in its 
foreign policy. This is evident with PRC dealings with countries throughout the world and 
particularly in Africa; for example, despite international condemnation of the regime in 
Zimbabwe the PRC remains a major exporter of arms to the African state.314 
The key difference though between the 2006 coup and those of 1987 and 2000 has been the 
greater overall level of engagement of the PRC with Fiji. In 1987 and even in 2000, the PRC 
had comparatively low levels of interaction with Fiji and so any response to the coup would 
likely have been insignificant. By 2006 with the promises made in the Ministerial Conference 
of China Pacific Island Countries Economic Development Forum the PRC had committed to a 
much greater role in Fiji and other South Pacific states. Many of the promises made at this 
meeting had not been implemented by the time the 2006 Fiji coup took place, or were long-
term commitments of funding or assistance. A number of significant transactions were 
carried out or concluded shortly after the coup took place. In August 2007 the Chinese 
ambassador to Fiji Cai Jinbiao made a statement saying that the political situation in Fiji was 
an “internal matter” and that the commitments made by China in 2006 would still be 
effective in 2007.315 This included the Navuso Bridge project and US$ 150million for the 
Somosomo hydro-electric power project.316 
Despite the coup in Fiji being seen by the PRC as a purely domestic concern for the people of 
Fiji, this distancing framing has not always been applied to the Chinese response the New 
Zealand and Australian sanctions on Fiji.317 In 2007 on Fiji TV, Deputy Director of the PRC 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Deng Hongbo announced that Fiji needed constructive 
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engagement and not exclusion from other states.318 Deng went on to say that unilateral 
action by outside powers towards Fiji was “not right and unhelpful.”319 This criticism of 
states’ unilateral responses to the Fiji coup is significant as it shows a proactive policy 
towards the Bainimarama government rather than a passive one. The PRC was actively 
promoting a policy contrary to that of New Zealand. Deng even goes so far as to say that 
“China is pleased with Fiji’s plans to hold democratic elections and believes it will be 
achieved under the leadership of the present government.”320 So not only is Deng criticising 
the unilateral approaches of other states such as New Zealand, he is also alluding to the fact 
that the PRC is happy with the Fijian government’s planned return to democracy. This is 
surprising as the PRC have consistently deemed the internal politics of Fiji to be none of their 
concern. By commenting on Bainimarama’s progress towards holding elections the PRC are 
taking into consideration the domestic politics of Fiji. While the significance of this interview 
should not be overstated it casts doubt over the claims that the PRC is purely increasing its 
ties with Fiji and not involved in the debate over the legitimacy of the Fijian government. 
The interaction with the PRC following the coup has not been entirely one-sided with interim 
Prime Minister Bainimarama announcing that Chinese tourists would no longer require a 
visitor’s visa when travelling to Fiji.321 While this change may not be especially significant, it 
shows a clear change of policy from the increasingly restrictive visa requirements put on 
Chinese tourists by the Qarase government discussed in Chapter two.322 The previously cited 
issues of overstaying and criminal activity caused by Chinese migrants were not considered 
to be exacerbated by the visa changes Interim Finance Minister and former Prime Minister 
Mahendra Chaudhry claimed as the usual vetting procedures at the border would still be 
carried out for all visitors to Fiji.323 
Immediately after the coup Fiji-China business relations also continued, seemingly 
uninterrupted by the political instability. Taito Waradi interim Minister for Commerce, 
Industry, Investment and Communications made a statement at the China-Fiji Trade and 
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Investment Seminar held in September 2007 praising Chinese businesses for seeing past the 
political unrest in Fiji.  
You have chosen to see beyond our own shortcomings and failings and to see a future 
that is out there to be grasped, one that can only be brighter, if one has the will to 
learn from the failings of history.324 
Once again such statements that praise China for overlooking the domestic political situation 
in Fiji and the continuation of financial and political support for Fiji reveals the move towards 
China that Fiji is making. This relates back to the apparently growing sentiment in Fiji that 
the PRC will consistently support Fiji irrespective of any internal conflicts in the state.  
This level of increased engagement has continued with greater loans and aid sourced by the 
PRC as well as preferential travel agreements.325 The support from the PRC can almost be 
seen as a ‘scattergun’ or haphazard approach to unilateral support for Fiji following the 
coup. Support is given on an ad hoc basis rather than long term commitments to aid in Fiji.326 
New Zealand’s aid and engagement with the South Pacific by contrast is highly structured 
with overarching documents such as the Pacific Strategy 2007-2014 to manage how New 
Zealand delivers aid to the South Pacific.327 PRC aid and engagement on the other hand, 
appear to lack an overarching strategy in Fiji, focussing instead on a combination of 
investment and gifting. The PRC is looking to increase access for Chinese companies and 
improve diplomatic relations with Fiji and in exchange is providing preferential loans and 
other support for Fiji based upon what the Fiji government asks for or what the PRC appears 
to feel is appropriate. 
This sporadic and unstructured ‘gifting’ process is well documented in the period from 2006-
2010. For example in 2010 the PRC committed to pay to fence the Fiji Government House, 
the PRC also committed to provide grants for the relocation of the Navua hospital, to 
provide 12,000 tonnes of fertilizer for the Fijian agricultural sector as well as gifting US$ 
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96,825 worth of sewing machines to the Fiji Women’s Federation.328 These examples of 
disparate PRC assistance towards Fiji are significant as they show that while they appear to 
be based on improving the livelihoods of Fijians they lack the ‘grassroots’ approach delivered 
by New Zealand’s aid programme.  
Such ‘gifts’ from the PRC are not always without a financial catch. Following the 2006 coup 
the PRC has granted a number of substantial ‘soft’ loans to Fiji. In July 2007 Bainimarama 
announced that he was attempting to secure a significant portion of the US$600 million loan 
service set up by the 2006 Ministerial Conference of China Pacific Island Countries Economic 
Development and Cooperation Forum saying “we have never come across that large amount 
of money before and we would put it to good use.”329 While this request was not accepted 
in full due to bureaucratic difficulties as well as the facility being put in place for all South 
Pacific countries and not just Fiji, a number of substantial loans were granted to Fiji.330 For 
example a US$24.7 million loan was granted to build low cost housing in Fiji at an interest 
rate of 2 percent per anum to be paid off over 20 years under the 2006 Ministerial 
conference commitment.331 This loan like others under the US$600 million dedicated to the 
South Pacific provided for provisional interest write offs as well as having the potential to be 
converted to a grant under application.332 
 
This increased borrowing from the PRC has drawn criticism from the ousted Prime Minister 
of Fiji Laisenia Qarase, who called for restraint when borrowing from outside powers.333 
Qarase said that while borrowing in general can be good, excessive debt was bad for Fiji as it 
made the nation increasingly dependent on foreign lenders.334 Former Prime Minister and 
Coup leader Sitiveni Rabuka joined Qarase in his criticism of excessive debt claiming that not 
only was such debt dangerous, but also the projects were often unnecessary.335 Such 
criticism from opponents to the PRC regime may not be surprising; however, it shows that 
an increased PRC presence in Fiji is becoming ammunition for the opposition in Fiji. The issue 
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of increased debt to the PRC is not a Fiji specific issue with many states becoming indebted 
to the PRC. For example the Tongan Prime Minister Dr Fred Sevele commented that despite 
Tonga’s request for a US$ 55 million loan from the PRC China would not have any more 
influence over Tonga.336 Once again increases in the loans offered by the PRC have occurred 
throughout the South Pacific and so cannot be seen as solely an attempt to replace New 
Zealand and Australia in Fiji. Even so, the PRC debt burden has become a significant and 
divisive domestic political issue for Fiji. 
PRC investment and attempts to gain access to Fijian markets are predominantly seen in the 
financial and tourism sectors as well as in the fisheries industry. In 2007 the PRC government 
began looking at the possibility of setting up a branch of the China Development Bank in 
Suva,337 and in 2010 Chinese Unionpay credit cards began being accepted in Fiji with the 
President and Chief Executive of the Bank Card Association saying that choosing to introduce 
Unionpay cards to Fiji was obvious given Fiji’s close trading relationship with China.338 By 
increasing dependence on PRC financial institutions not only is the PRC receiving profit, it is 
also creating long term ties with Fiji in the financial sector. While developed countries such 
as New Zealand also rely on foreign financiers, the strength of their economies and 
institutions as well as a lower level of debt in relation to GDP reduce the pressure of foreign 
lenders. A greater engagement of foreign lenders has the potential to further entrench the 
PRC in the South Pacific by increasing reliance on foreign financiers and investors.  
An area that the PRC has worked to control a greater share of is the Fijian Tuna industry, 
signing a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Fijian government to improve 
access for PRC vessels in the fisheries sector.339 This has had a significant impact with 
Chinese fleets dominating those now operating in Fijian waters.340 This policy has come at a 
cost to the Fijian people with conflicts between local operators as well as notably reduced 
catches of tuna since PRC involvement in the industry.341 While many of the decisions to 
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open up the fisheries industry were made before the 2006 coup, the continued involvement 
of the PRC has significant long term implications on the Fijian tuna industry. 
The prospect of increased tourism from the PRC to Fiji has been widely discussed and 
engaged with by Fijian leaders since Fiji received Approved Destination Status (ADS) in 
2004.342 The number of Chinese tourists has increased steadily since then with the influx 
continuing despite the 2006 coup which saw a temporary drop in tourists from New Zealand 
and Australia.343 Not only has this provided tourism operators with much-needed revenue 
and diversified the places from which tourists come from it has also encouraged Chinese 
firms to invest in Fiji. In 2009 China Suzhou Youth Travel Service Company Limited 
announced that they would be building a ‘first class’ hotel that would “reflect the elegance 
and space of ancient places in China including Beijing’s legendary Forbidden City.”344 While 
the increase in Chinese tourist numbers and Chinese investment in the Fijian tourism sector 
cannot be viewed as entirely due to PRC unilateral engagement, Chinese investors and 
corporations tend to engage with states that have a good relationship with China as market 
access and opportunities are likely to be greater than in states with a less favourable 
relationship. The unfettered continuation of such business activities despite the 2006 coup 
further reflects that the PRC was not deterred by the political instability of Fiji.  
 
Despite many of the new PRC commitments to Fiji being agreed upon before the 2006 coup 
took place, a number of new areas of engagement can be seen as a direct response to the 
2006 coup. Most notably the gaps in training and funding due to sanctions put in place by 
New Zealand and Australia have been filled by the PRC and Chinese companies. While there 
appears to be little evidence to suggest that this move has been a deliberate outreach by the 
PRC to assume roles that were previously filled by New Zealand, the reality is that the PRC 
has taken up many of these positions effectively reducing the impact New Zealand’s 
sanctions have on Fiji.  
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New Zealand’s Unilateral Response to the 2006 Fiji coup 
Following the coup New Zealand banned all levels of military engagement with Fiji, including 
training operations.345 Bainimarama was quick to find a new international partner to replace 
New Zealand as an important military contact. In January 2007, just over a month after New 
Zealand put sanctions in place Bainimarama announced that “we have to talk to China about 
continuation of military courses, which has been stopped by Australia and New Zealand.”346 
Bainimarama went on to say that the PRC had been providing training for Fijian soldiers 
since 2000 and this would just be increasing that relationship.347 Rather than pressuring Fiji 
to return to democracy, the sanctions put in place by the New Zealand government have 
encouraged Fiji to fill any gaps created by expanding its engagement with the PRC. 
This increased military relationship between Suva and Beijing has had a greater impact than 
simply reducing the effectiveness of New Zealand’s sanctions on Fiji. It has been seen by 
some as a threat to the stability of the region more generally, as PRC military engagement 
across the South Pacific increases. In September 2010 a delegation from China’s Defence 
Ministry visited Suva,348 soon after two Chinese warships toured the South Pacific in August 
2010.349 These actions may be viewed as potentially provocative given that New Zealand and 
Australia had traditionally been the most active outside military powers engaging with Fiji. 
The potential military and economic threat posed by China in the South Pacific is not 
altogether new but it has become more pronounced following the 2006 coup as gaps in the 
training of Fijian military caused by Australian and New Zealand sanctions are filled by the 
PRC. It is arguable that the 2009 Australian Defence White Paper calling for increases in 
offshore naval capacity was a response to a greater PRC presence in the region that 
warranted a deterrent force.350 Fiji’s central location in the South Pacific as well as it being 
the home of the Forum Secretariat, the University of the South Pacific and other regional 
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headquarters make it a vital strategic location in the region. A greater Chinese military 
presence may threaten Australian and New Zealand control of this resource.351 
The increased presence of the PRC military in the South Pacific is not an inherently 
destabilising factor and may have real benefits for Fiji in terms of training and equipment. 
However, as this engagement is occurring while the New Zealand and Australian 
government’s attempt to pressure Fiji with sanctions they are likely to give the Bainimarama 
administration a greater ability to resist public discontent. Furthermore, such actions may be 
unhelpful for Chinese foreign policy in the region as they are likely to appear aggressive and 
opportunistic in opposition to China’s peaceful non-interference policy. 
Thus, in conclusion, following the 2006 coup the PRC and New Zealand have taken two 
noticeably different unilateral responses to the political situation in Fiji.  New Zealand began 
by immediately pressuring Fiji to hold democratic elections through tough unilateral 
sanctions on the Bainimarama regime and even the public of Fiji to motivate among the 
public of Fiji an uprising against the illegitimate government. While these sanctions have 
relaxed slightly under the National government coalition, New Zealand’s unilateral position 
is still to distance itself from the Bainimarama regime and attempt to pressure the Fijian 
government to hold democratic elections. The PRC on the other hand, has continued to 
embrace its increasing unilateral relationship with Fiji even going so far as to criticise the 
positions of states such as New Zealand for not engaging with Fiji. At the same time Fiji has 
responded to the pressure imposed by New Zealand, Australia and other Western states by 
actively seeking to make up for the lost aid and diplomatic ties by looking towards the PRC. It 
seems that rather than pressuring Fiji to hold democratic elections New Zealand’s unilateral 
response to the Fiji coup has forced Bainimarama to diversify Fijian relations and look north 
to China.352  
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Chapter four: New Zealand, the PRC 
and regional responses to the 2006 
Fiji Coup 
Regional organisations have become an increasingly utilised mechanism of interstate 
dialogue and policy. Such organisations are particularly useful to not only encourage 
dialogue between states and resolve possible intra and interstate tensions, but they also 
serve as useful mechanisms for creating a coherent regional policy direction. Both New 
Zealand and the People’s Republic of China have significant interests in South Pacific States 
and regional organisations. As a central and powerful regional figure Fiji also enjoys 
membership in many of the same groups. New Zealand and Fiji are founding members of the 
Pacific Islands Forum while the PRC is an Official Forum Dialogue Partner. Both New Zealand 
and Fiji are members of the Commonwealth of Nations due to the shared colonial history. 
Fiji is a member of the increasingly vocal and important Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) 
while the PRC provides significant financial support for the MSG. This chapter looks at the 
multilateral response by New Zealand and the PRC to the 2006 Fiji coup.  
As mentioned in chapter three, New Zealand rapidly responded to the 2006 coup with wide 
ranging sanctions put in place on the 5th of December 2006.353 This declaration was not 
solely limited to direct sanctioning of the Bainimarama regime, but it also included options 
for New Zealand to use its international and regional influence to respond to the coup. Helen 
Clark announced immediately following the coup that New Zealand would work with 
“likeminded countries as well as relevant multinational organisations such as the Pacific 
Islands Forum and the Commonwealth “to explore what further steps can be taken in 
response to the coup.”354 ‘Likeminded countries’ pointed largely at Australia who had 
devised similar sanctions against Fiji and with whom New Zealand was increasingly teaming 
up with for its Pacific policy direction.355 It is unlikely that the PRC would be considered a 
‘likeminded country’ despite New Zealand’s increasing political and economic engagement 
with the Chinese. Needless to say there is no obvious evidence to support any attempt by 
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New Zealand to convince the PRC to adopt a similar stance towards Fiji although John Key 
suggested the issue might be raised in a meeting with Chinese Premier Wen in a visit in April 
2009.356 Whether this issue was actually discussed is unclear, what is evident is that no overt 
policy change was obvious following the meeting between Premier Wen and Mr Key. This is 
likely to be not only because of the fact that the PRC lacks transparency in its foreign policy 
decision making and direction, but also because of New Zealand’s relative size and influence 
when compared with the PRC and the possibility of souring Sino-NZ relations should New 
Zealand attempt to encourage a change in PRC policy. 
While New Zealand has been a staunch critic of the 2006 coup and the PRC has appeared to 
be indifferent to the change in government, the direct actions of the two cannot be viewed 
in isolation in the lead up to, and following the 2006 crisis. This wider approach looking at 
the roles and responses of other key actors is important due to the aforementioned claim by 
the Clark government that New Zealand would use its influence with ‘likeminded countries’ 
as well as Intergovernmental Organisations such as the Pacific Islands Forum, the 
Commonwealth and the UN.357 Because the PRC is not an official member of the Pacific 
Islands Forum and is not a member of the Commonwealth, these two groups can be viewed 
as potentially influential tools for the New Zealand Government outside of comprehensive 
PRC authority. The PRC plays a much more informal role in the Regions organisations as a 
major donor to the Pacific Islands Forum and the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) as 
well as being an Official Dialogue Partner to the PIF.  
The Pacific Islands Forum  
Australia and New Zealand have been the harshest critics of the Fiji coup of all South Pacific 
countries. Their increasingly conditional aid policies, combined with the ‘arc of instability’ 
approach to Melanesia had already created a clear divide in the Forum, exacerbated by the 
underlying relative regional power and wealth of New Zealand and Australia in the region.358 
Because the 2006 coup had been predicted for weeks, if not months before it took place, the 
Pacific Islands Forum had begun forming a strategic unit to respond to the growing impasse 
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between the military and the government in Fiji.359 On the 1st of December 2006, the Forum 
Foreign Affairs Ministers met in Sydney to discuss the deteriorating situation in Fiji and the 
potential responses that could be made at a Forum level.360 The decision was made to set up 
and send an Eminent Persons Group (EPG), justified under the 2000 Biketawa Declaration to 
Fiji to assess the situation and report back to the Ministry heads so as to plan a course of 
action.361 The December 5th coup meant that the EPG did not finalise its terms of reference 
until the 15th of December when the coup had already taken place.362 The group was chaired 
by Sato Kilman the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister of Vanuatu, the 
other members of the group were Faumina Liuga the Samoan Minister for Resources and the 
Environment, Peter Cosgrove, the former Chief of the Australian Defence force and Sir 
Arnold Amet the former Chief Justice of Papua New Guinea.363 The terms of reference for 
the group were to look into the underlying causes of the RFMF intervention and to assess 
the likelihood of a resolution to the crisis in Fiji in the short and medium term. They were 
then to examine the steps needed for Fiji to quickly return to democratic rule and finally to 
look into the role of the Forum and how it could best assist Fiji to resolve the political 
crisis.364 
Somewhat surprisingly, Interim Prime Minister Bainimarama accepted the group’s terms of 
reference and welcomed the group to come and help Fiji, “we reiterate that Fiji stands ready 
to hear wise counsel and practical advice that seeks to take the country forward and address 
the difficulty we face.”365 This language suggests that Bainimarama hoped that the EPG 
would provide constructive feedback on ways to return Fiji to democracy, given that the 
coup had taken place and was “water under the bridge.”366 The group spent four days in Fiji 
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consulting with key stakeholders in January 2007.367 Meetings were held with both the 
previous government and the current government, as well as with President Iloilo, the 
Chairman of the Great Council of Chiefs and other important actors in Fiji from the media, 
civil society and religious groups.368 The report drafted by the EPG following the 
consultations was critical of the 2006 coup finding that it had “no justification in law”, 
despite the RFMF claiming the doctrine of necessity “the EPG is persuaded by the majority 
view that the RFMF’s takeover of government was unlawful.369 As such, the EPG found that 
the logical next step for Fiji would be to bring back the constitutionally elected Qarase 
government.370 The EPG went further to suggest that the RFMF lacked the support of the 
majority of individuals as it had suggested, and the timeframe given of at least three years 
for democratic elections to take place was excessive as many of the other important 
stakeholders believed elections in eighteen months to two years was reasonable.371 The 
report went on to suggest that Bainimarama was blurring the distinction between the 
military and the government and ought to step down as PM as well as claiming that the 
independence of the judiciary had been compromised.372 The report closed with the 
comment that those interviewed wished for close engagement by the Forum and 
encouraged unity in the Forum in its response to the 2006 coup.373 
While this report was not an official Forum declaration it was quickly picked up by both New 
Zealand’s Foreign Minister Winston Peters and Prime Minister Helen Clark who publicly 
called for Fiji to accept the EPG report and return to democracy within two years.374 These 
statements took place even before the Forum Foreign Affairs Meeting in March had decided 
on a Forum response to the report. Once again this shows New Zealand’s attempts to sway 
the Forum in its policy towards Fiji, despite claims that it would await the outcome of the 
                                                          
367
 "Forum EPG to Fiji Completes Consultations ", Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat 
http://www.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/newsroom/press-statements/2007/forum-epg-fiji-completes-
consultations.html. 
368
 Ibid. 
369
 "Forum Eminent Persons Group Report ", Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 
http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2007/February/EPG_Report_2007.pdf. 
370
 Ibid. 
371
 Ibid. 
372
 Ibid. 
373
 Ibid. 
374
 "Vanuatu 'foreign ministers' talks vital for Fiji and Pacific - Winston Peters," Radio New Zealand 
International, 15/03/2007., "NZ Prime Minister says Fiji military must accept the EPG report," Radio New 
Zealand International, 19/02/2007.  
 68 
 
Forum meeting to determine the status of its future relations towards Fiji. 375 The Ministers’ 
meeting in March 2007 endorsed the EPG report and recognised the willingness of Fijian 
officials to return to democracy. However, it felt that elections could and should take place 
within two years if not sooner, rejecting the RFMF claim that they would need at least three 
years to prepare for elections.376 The meeting went on to establish a “staged process of 
engagement with the interim government” to aid in the move towards elections.377 These 
conditions were subsequently accepted by the Fijian regime amidst claims engagement with 
Fiji would be more reasonable and effective than exclusion.378  
The outcome of the Vanuatu meeting was certainly influenced by New Zealand and 
Australia’s hard-line towards Fiji and pressure for democratic reform in the South Pacific. 
However, the resolution from the meeting was certainly not as hard-line as New Zealand’s 
stance towards Fiji or even the language used and recommendations of the EPG report. The 
Forum was much more willing to engage with Fiji and encourage a return to democracy 
through assistance rather than sanctions. This can be explained largely by the moderating 
effect of other states in the Forum. As dealt with in chapter one, Melanesian states have 
been subject to widespread political instability and violations of human rights and the rule of 
law. The 2003 RAMSI intervention is testament to this; even in Polynesia, until November 
2010 Tonga still had an acting King and is in transition to a more representative electoral 
system; the Samoa political system lacks transparency and has been subject to recent 
criticism as to its poor division of Church and State.379 This all means that strong 
condemnation from other South Pacific states was unlikely for fear of a precedent that could 
be used against them in the future.  Consequently, initially the Forum developed a much 
more moderated and lenient stance towards Fiji than Australia and New Zealand lobbied for. 
Much of the resistance in the Pacific Islands Forum towards the suspension of Fiji was based 
upon the commitments of the Bainimarama administration to hold elections by the end of 
2009. Despite assurances by the Fijian government in 2007 that the EPG mandates would be 
followed and electoral reform would be completed for elections to be held by the deadline 
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this message became increasingly contradictory in 2008 and 2009. Despite initially strong 
support from the Melanesian group of nations, support for Fiji appeared to diminish as 
targets and commitments were missed by the Bainimarama government.  
The interactions between Fiji and the Forum in 2008 can be seen as a game of ‘cat and 
mouse’ with Fiji wavering between support of the Forum working group mandate and 
condemnation of it. Despite relatively consistent support for the Forum working group in 
2007, in early 2008 Bainimarama began reneging on previous commitments to hold elections 
in 2009.380 The Clark government was sceptical of Bainimarama’s assertions that Fiji was 
making definitive steps towards democracy, claiming that he had committed to hold 
elections by the first quarter of 2009 at the latest and had since given little reassurance that 
he was actually willing to step down from power.381 In June 2008 Bainimarama began 
questioning the benefits of the Forum-Fiji Joint Working Group.382 This attempt to distance 
Fiji from the group was a response to the continuation of New Zealand government bans on 
Fijian civil servants, including those involved in Joint Working Group activities.383 Deputy 
Permanent Secretary for Information Major Neumi Leweni insisted that New Zealand’s travel 
bans were more extensive than those put in place following the 2000 Fiji coup, despite the 
interim government being in a similar position to the Bainimarama administration.384 The 
unilateral and multilateral responses by New Zealand were affecting Fiji’s relationship with 
and involvement in the Forum. The relationship between the Working Group and Fiji 
deteriorated further as Bainimarama announced that talks with the Forum Working Group 
would not continue “until such time the positions of Australia and New Zealand are 
genuine.”385 Bainimarama went on to suggest that New Zealand and Australia were not 
willing to even look at the progress Fiji had made because of their unwarranted fixation 
upon the “military-dominated administration.”386 Whether or not such statements were 
accurate, clearly Bainimarama was using the sanctions and behaviour of New Zealand 
towards Fiji as an excuse not to hold to the Forum schedule for democratic elections. 
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The Working Group response to Bainimarama’s claims that he would leave the working 
group was met with pleas to continue engaging with the Forum dialogue process, with 
members alleging that the dialogue process was valuable for the Forum to engage with 
Fiji.387 From this point the Fijian government changed tack with the Fijian electoral 
commission claiming to visiting Forum Foreign Ministers contact group members that an 
additional US$6.75 million was needed to hold democratic elections within the Forum 
timeframe.388 Just two days after this announcement Bainimarama stated that the meeting 
with the Ministerial Contact Group went well despite previous confrontation with Australia 
and New Zealand; however, he at no point had promised that elections would take place by 
March 2009.389 It seems that this was a period of uncertainty whereby the Fijian government 
was setting up a series of obstacles that could potentially derail plans for 2009 elections in 
Fiji.  
The relationship between the Forum and Fiji became even more strained towards the end of 
2008 with Bainimarama failing to attend the Niue Pacific Island’s Forum Meeting causing the 
Fiji Sun newspaper, usually a strong advocate of the Fiji government to report that Fiji’s 
absence was an opportunity lost.390 Fiji’s absence from the meeting was insinuated before 
the meeting took place as it was announced that Fiji would be excluded from the Post Forum 
Dialogue process held in New Zealand due to the continuing sanctions imposed upon Fiji by 
the New Zealand government.391 Once again the Bainimarama government was able to claim 
that New Zealand was unwilling to engage with Fiji at a Forum level as they were 
unreasonably excluding Fiji from Forum meetings that Fiji was entitled to attend as a full 
member of the Forum.  
The 2007 Niue Forum meeting scheduled a special meeting to be held in Papua New Guinea 
in January 2008 to assess the progress Fiji was making towards holding elections by the end 
of March 2008.392In early January 2008 in the lead-up to the PNG meeting, Aiyaz Sayed-
Khaiyum Fiji’s Attorney-General stated that no date for elections had been discussed.393 In 
                                                          
387
 "Forum Group encourages Fiji to remain engaged," Fijilive, 27/06/2008. 
388
 "Fiji seeks $7 million to supplement election costs," Fijilive, 16/07/2008. 
389
 "Bainimarama: I didn't promise March elections," Fijilive, 18/07/2008. 
390
 "Fiji's absence from Niue Forum regrettable," Fiji Sun, 18/08/2008. 
391
 "Fiji threatens to pull out of Forum," Fijilive, 15/08/2008. 
392
 "PNG to host Forum leaders for talks on Fiji," PNG Post-Courier, 08/01/2009. 
393
 "Fiji official clarifies: No firm date for elections," Radio New Zealand International, 06/01/2009. 
 71 
 
November 2008 the New Zealand General Election saw the Clark government responsible for 
the hard line approach towards Fiji replaced with a National Coalition lead by John Key. 
Despite the Key government insisting that the sanctions on Fiji were made by ‘the previous 
government’, when Fiji reneged on its commitments to hold democratic elections by March 
2009 the Key government was clear that the Pacific Islands Forum needed to show 
leadership in the region and send a clear message to Fiji that real progress towards elections 
needed to be made.394 However, the hard-line put forward by Australia and New Zealand at 
a multilateral Forum level had never been consistently shared by other Forum members. In 
January 2008 the Tongan government called for the Forum to look for ways to improve the 
situation in Fiji and not think of excluding them from the Forum.395 
The resistance from critical Forum members diminished with Bainimarama failing to attend 
the PNG meeting due to flooding in Fiji, despite attempts by PNG Prime Minister Michael 
Somare to delay the meeting so Bainimarama could attend.396 The meeting condemned Fiji’s 
lack of progress towards democracy and set a new timetable for democratic elections with 
“targeted measures” under the Biketawa declaration to be put in place unless a new election 
date of no later than the end of December 2009 is set by May 1st 2009.397 Despite this strong 
condemnation of the Fijian regime not all the members of the Forum were happy with 
partial or full suspension of Fiji as a resolution to the impasse with PNG, the Solomon Islands, 
Vanuatu and Samoa all publicly opposing suspension.398 This divide in the Forum between 
states that supported engagement and those who favoured exclusion was widened in April 
2009 with the Prime Minister of Kiribati Anote Tong publicly stating that isolating Fiji would 
not encourage Fiji to return to democracy.399 This sentiment was reiterated by the Cook 
Islands deputy Prime Minister Sir Terepai Moate saying that Fiji was feeling “cornered and 
bullied” and only when trust can be built between parties would progress be made.400 While 
the Forum was not altogether polarised into supporters of Bainimarama and his critics, many 
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member states called for a more inclusive approach towards Fiji rather than simply 
threatening and excluding the interim regime.  
The May 1st deadline for Fiji passed without any credible steps to hold elections by the end 
of 2009; instead, Bainimarama insisted that elections could not be held until 2014.401 Despite 
strong opposition to the suspension of Fiji from the Pacific Islands Forum in early 2008, New 
Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs Murray McCully announced that the passing of the 
deadline meant that the suspension of Fiji from the Forum was “inevitable.”402 On the 2nd of 
May 2009 Chair of the Pacific Islands Forum and Premier of Niue, Toke Talagi, announced 
that the Bainimarama regime had been suspended from the Forum under the ‘targeted 
measures’ agreed upon in Port Moresby in January.403 Talagi stated that the effects of the 
suspension would be unlikely to be felt immediately but the Fijian government would feel 
the pressure over the next 12 months.404 The wording of the suspension was significant as 
the Republic of Fiji was not suspended from the Forum but rather the military-dominated 
regime led by Bainimarama was suspended.405 Furthermore, it is significant that the 
government of Fiji was suspended from the Forum under the principles laid out in Port 
Moresby despite many Forum members announcing that they did not support the 
suspension after the meeting had taken place. This ‘change of heart’ may possibly be 
attributed to the strong rhetoric from Australia and New Zealand calling for Fiji’s suspension, 
or it could be seen as Pacific states not wanting to appear to favour an exclusionary 
approach to Fiji. This theory is supported by Solomon Islands Prime Minister Derek Sikua 
claiming that the Fiji suspension was justified under the PNG principles after Talagi 
announced Fiji’s formal suspension, despite publicly condemning the prospect of suspending 
Fiji earlier in the year.406 
Despite the apparent unanimity towards the suspension of Fiji from the Forum, the divide 
between those supporting Fiji’s involvement and those favouring exclusion was revealed 
with the 2009 PACER trade talks, with some Forum members believing that Fiji’s suspension 
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from the Forum should not exclude Fiji from regional trade talks, particularly given Fiji’s 
relative economic power in the South Pacific.407 This feeling was certainly not shared by the 
New Zealand government with New Zealand’s Trade Minister, Tim Groser stating that Fiji 
would not be welcome at the PACER meetings.408 The assumption by New Zealand that Fiji 
would not be attending PACER talks drew widespread criticism in the South Pacific with the 
PNG newspaper The National commenting that “any regional trade agreement without Fiji is 
unlikely to be worth the paper it is written on.”409 New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Murray McCully defended the decision to expel Fiji from the meetings saying that Fiji would 
be able to join the “process as it develops with the aim of seeing it join once it decides to 
resume normal relations with the region.”410 It is clear with this statement that ‘normal 
relations’ means a return to democratic rule or tangible, convincing steps to return to 
democracy in Fiji. By setting the criteria for Fiji’s re-admission to PACER without Forum 
consensus on the matter, New Zealand risked further polarising the Forum and gave 
credibility to Bainimarama’s allegations of New Zealand’s bullying of Pacific States. 
Overall, the impact New Zealand has had on the Forum in implementing its December 5th 
pledge to use its regional diplomatic influence to pressure Fiji into holding democratic 
elections has been significant.411 The Clark government’s pressure to send the EPG to Fiji and 
establish the Forum-Fiji joint working group is likely to have been a crucial factor in the 
Bainimarama government’s eventual suspension from the Forum. The pressure imposed by 
the Key government to suspend Fiji from the Forum and PACER despite vocal opposition 
from other Pacific island states, shows New Zealand to be pushing a Fiji policy for the region 
that may be contrary to the policy directions of other Pacific States, given that the criteria 
set in PNG was passed unanimously and previous critics of an exclusionary approach towards 
Fiji from other South Pacific States were temporarily accepting of Fiji’s suspension. The key 
problem with this approach is that the hard-line policy towards Fiji can still be seen as a New 
Zealand and Australia-driven initiative. Even though Pacific states unanimously voted for the 
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principles set up in PNG, many were openly critical after the meeting of the prospect of 
suspending Fiji suggesting they were pressured into assuming the trans-Tasman response to 
the coup.412 Fiji’s interim Attorney-General Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum called the move a 
‘geopolitical’ move to secure power by New Zealand and Australia thinly veiled by attempts 
to restore democracy in Fiji.413 While this may only be rhetoric from the Bainimarama 
administration, what is clear is that despite apparent unanimity in the Forum to suspend Fiji, 
New Zealand and Australia have been key factors in convincing states to vote one way or 
another. Some Forum states may seek to counter Australian and New Zealand apparent 
domination by becoming increasingly active in sub-regional organisations such as the 
Melanesian Spearhead Group or by further engaging other powerful actors such as the PRC. 
The Melanesian Spearhead Group 
Despite having been in existence since 1990 the MSG had not been a particularly vocal 
regional actor until the 2006 Fiji coup, tending to be dominated by the presence of the 
Forum in the region as well as severe domestic instability in MSG member states. The 
sudden proactive nature of the MSG has coincided with the Chinese funding and building of 
a multimillion dollar secretariat building for the Group in the Vanuatu capital Port Vila.414 
Prior to the establishment of a permanent secretariat, the MSG was more of an informal 
group that met to discuss Melanesian issues through an inter governmental dialogue process 
as opposed to a unified lobby group of Melanesian nations active within the Pacific Islands 
Forum. Whether intentionally or not, the financial backing from the PRC has raised the 
profile of the MSG in the South Pacific and in the Pacific Islands Forum, which is likely to 
have long-term implications for the Region, New Zealand’s position within it, and the PRC. 
Following the 2006 coup the four members of the fledgling Melanesian Spearhead Group 
met to discuss the Fiji crisis. Given that New Zealand is not a member of the organisation, 
the position of the MSG is useful in determining not only the Melanesian perspective (one 
that can be somewhat muted by the dominating influence of New Zealand and Australia) in 
but also revealing any regional divisions in the Forum. On the 13th of December Solomon 
Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare called for a MSG delegation to be sent to Fiji "for 
the express purpose of seeking the re-establishment of dialogue and to assist in any way 
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possible to achieve a peaceful resolution.”415 While Sogavare was critical of RFMF actions 
and called for a swift return to democracy he believed that the imposition of sanctions 
would be counterproductive and would most likely harm the general public of Fiji and not 
the interim regime.416 While it is unlikely that the MSG would impose sanctions on Fiji given 
that it is one of only four members, it shows a desire for engagement with Fiji. The MSG 
certainly took a very different approach towards Fiji than New Zealand had, actively 
engaging with Fiji rather than seeking to achieve a resolution to the crisis through exclusion 
and pressure. This sentiment was made even stronger at the meeting of MSG leaders in 
Honiara in January 2007, with the MSG commenting that major institutions in Fiji appeared 
to be supporting the interim government giving it more legitimacy, that sanctions were not 
the answer for the Fijian situation and that Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon 
Islands would “fight any move to have Fiji suspended from the Pacific Islands Forum.”417 This 
apparent rallying behind Fiji can be seen as going directly against the policies of Australia 
and New Zealand, causing the Solomon Star to comment that “What our leaders do now 
may defy international norm because we render support for a military regime in Fiji but it’s 
our Melanesian obligation.”418 This sentiment was reiterated by the Fiji Sun Newspaper 
which directly criticised the policy of New Zealand towards Fiji, saying that Melanesia has 
other options to turn to if New Zealand and Australia are too hard-line in their policies 
towards South Pacific states. 419 
...the island nations have other cards to play. China, Singapore, Malaysia, India and 
Indonesia to name but five are keen to extend their foreign policy reach into the South 
Pacific region - previously regarded as an Australian and New Zealand lake.420 
This media discourse criticising the approach of New Zealand and Australia and suggesting 
that the South Pacific had other options for support in the international community signals 
the rising presence of the PRC and other actors in the region offering an alternative to the 
traditional support from Australia and New Zealand. While New Zealand and Australia are 
focussed on improving the governance of South Pacific states, the MSG is much more 
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insular. With a small base of members, all with varying degrees of political instability, the 
states tend to favour a more non-interventionist approach to politics. However, it must be 
remembered that predictions that the MSG has made the Pacific Islands Forum less relevant 
can be traced back to the 1990s with an editorial in the Fiji Times claiming that the Forum 
was diminishing while factions such as the MSG emerged, further fragmenting the already 
troubled regional organisation.421  The MSG has often been touted as a threat to the stability 
of the Forum, particularly given the unity in Melanesia through similar cultures and political 
experiences.  
The MSG was, however, tentative in its acceptance of Fiji fully into the organisation 
following the coup with member states fearing that MSG attempts to get donor assistance 
might be hampered by Fiji’s participation in the organisation.422 While this concern was 
raised by members, Fiji was not removed or restricted from participating fully in the 
organisation. The PRC funded the building of the MSG secretariat building in Vanuatu. The 
17th MSG meeting coincided with its opening in May 2008 with Bainimarama attending and 
speaking on the positive progress Fiji was making towards democracy.423 This policy of 
engagement with Fiji demonstrated by the MSG was reflected in its individual member’s 
behaviour, with the Solomon Islands announcing the move to formally establish a diplomatic 
mission in Fiji in December 2008, going against the trend of the Forum to move further away 
from Fiji with the expulsion of New Zealand’s second High Commissioner to Fiji Caroline 
McDonald.424 The different approach from the MSG was further shown with Vanuatu PM 
and MSG Chairman Edward Natapei calling for engagement and cooperation with Fiji, not 
exclusion.  Natapei also insisted that the MSG was unified in this approach to Fiji.425  MSG 
members PNG, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu all publicly condemned the proposition to 
suspend Fiji from the Pacific Islands Forum before the Bainimarama government was 
eventually removed.426 The openly contrary MSG approach to Fiji was reflected again in 2009 
with the Group openly supporting Fiji’s inclusion in the PACER negotiations despite New 
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Zealand dismissing the idea.427 It seems that the MSG opinion towards Fiji is much more 
conciliatory in the Melanesian grouping than under the Forum dominated by New Zealand 
and Australia.  
In 2010 the MSG has shown itself to be increasingly vocal in its support of Fiji with the 2010 
MSG summit due to give the Chairmanship of the Group to Fiji’s Bainimarama. This meeting 
is yet another example of PRC support for the increasingly divisive group, with the Chinese 
government giving US$50,000 towards the cost of the meeting.428 Whether intentional or 
not a meeting that was set to appoint a politically divisive character in the region as 
chairman had a very real potential to polarise the region, an event that may not have even 
taken place without PRC support. The fact that the MSG summit was becoming a soapbox 
for Bainimarama was shown with the invitation to the meeting extended to other Pacific 
states with the potential to have ten of the sixteen Forum members present.429 The meeting 
was called off at the last minute by Vanuatu Prime Minister Natapei saying that the long-
term implications for the MSG of Fiji acting as Chair would be damaging for the 
organisation.430 Furthermore, like the Pacific Islands Forum the MSG charter entrenches “the 
rule of law, judicial independence, transparency and accountability.”431 By appointing 
Bainimarama as the Chairman of the MSG these principles would have been violated.432 
Despite the disconnect between the Principles of the MSG charter and the behaviour of the 
Fiji regime, Bainimarama did not view the cancellation of the meeting as an incompatibility 
between his regime and the fundamental principles of the MSG. Instead, Bainimarama 
attributed this ‘change of heart’ to New Zealand and Australia pressuring MSG members to 
abandon the Suva MSG meeting.433  
The 2010 Suva meeting was not entirely dismissed however, with Bainimarama hosting a 
‘friends of Fiji meeting’ instead of a formal MSG summit.434 The same Forum member states 
were invited with representatives of ten states eventually attending the meeting including 
the MSG member states as well as Kiribati, Tuvalu, Tonga, Federated States of Micronesia, 
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Marshall Islands, Nauru and East Timor.435 While this was not an official MSG process, the 
attendance of representatives from these Pacific states appears to cast doubt upon the true 
unanimity of the Forum in its position towards Fiji. New Zealand Prime Minister John Key 
was more sceptical as to the real impact of the meeting saying that unless the attendees of 
the ‘Friends of Fiji’ meeting raised concerns about the Forum approach to Fiji at the 2010 
meeting then Bainimarama “really hasn’t gained much.”436’ 
The issue of Fiji’s chairmanship of the MSG has become an increasingly difficult issue for the 
group with divisions appearing in the MSG of those who support further engagement with 
Fiji and those who do not. Certainly the decision by Vanuatu PM Natapei to call off the July 
2007 MSG summit puts Vanuatu on the side of caution when it comes to Fiji. This change of 
heart may have come to pass through strong criticism in the Vanuatu media over MSG 
support for Fiji, making the Suva summit a domestic issue for Vanuatu.437 On the other end 
of the spectrum the Solomon Islands has been a strong supporter of Bainimarama since the 
2006 coup. Dr Derek Sikua Solomon Islands PM announced to the MSG Secretariat that he 
had no issue with Fiji chairing and hosting the Summit that had been cancelled by 
Vanuatu.438 This effective impasse was supposed to be mediated by the Solomon Islands in 
Honiara in an MSG meeting in October 2010 with the aim to reduce the rift between 
Bainimarama and Natapei.439 The resolution for the meeting was to have the MSG 
Chairmanship transferred to the Solomon Islands where it would then be handed over to 
Fiji.440 Like the July Summit, this meeting was postponed at the last minute, this time by the 
Solomon Islands.441 Since the July meeting the Solomon Islands had elected a new Prime 
Minister Danny Philips, with the October postponement of the MSG meeting Phillips was to 
meet Bainimarama to assess the possibility of the Chairmanship to be handed over to Fiji 
which eventually took place in November 2010.442 
Overall, the MSG can be seen as a potentially divisive actor in the South Pacific given its 
often contrary stance to New Zealand and the Forum following the 2006 Fiji coup. PRC 
                                                          
435
 "Ten Pacific nations to attend 'Engaging Fiji'," Radio New Zealand International, 21/07/2010. 
436
 "Kiwi leader sees little gain in 'engaging Fiji'," Radio New Zealand International, 22/07/2010. 
437
 "Vanuatu must make stand against Fiji repression," Vanuatu Daily Post, 08/07/2010. 
438
 "Solomons' Sikua brings open mind to Fiji gathering," Fijilive, 20/07/2010. 
439
 "It's a done deal: Fiji to chair Melanesian Group," Radio New Zealand International, 17/10/2010. 
440
 Ibid. 
441
 Repeka Nasiko, "Melanesian Spearhead Group calls meeting off," Fijilive, 23/10/2010. 
442
 Ibid. 
 79 
 
support for the group has undeniably given the MSG greater credibility and presence in the 
South Pacific region, however, the lack of unity and coherence in MSG policy towards the Fiji 
‘issue’ has undoubtedly restricted the potential of the group as a regional player. Former 
Solomon Islands PM Manasseh Sogavare even went so far as to call the current MSG a 
“laughing stock.”443 Therefore, the role of the MSG following the coup is uncertain given its 
internal divisions and ‘infighting’ between members. Regardless, the MSG still can be seen as 
undermining the Pacific Islands Forum as its members and the Group have often been vocal 
as to their criticism of the Forum position towards Fiji. By funding the Vanuatu Secretariat 
and financing potentially divisive meetings, PRC support for the Group has effectively 
damaged the Pacific Islands Forum credibility as a regional actor. 
The Commonwealth 
The response of the Commonwealth to the 2006 coup can be seen as much more in line with 
the policies of Australia and New Zealand, as Fiji was swiftly and unanimously suspended 
from the Commonwealth after a meeting of a Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group 
made up of Ministers from Canada, Malta, Lesotho, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, St Lucia, 
Sri Lanka, Britain and Tanzania.444 The group commented that “the unconstitutional takeover 
constitutes a serious violation of the Commonwealth's fundamental principles.”445 Fiji would 
be banned from participating in meetings of Commonwealth Ministers and leaders until it 
had returned to democracy, any future technical assistance programmes to help Fiji would 
also be suspended until elections had taken place.446 While neither New Zealand or 
Australian Ministers were present in the meetings, the decision to immediately suspend Fiji 
with conditionality based on a return to democracy rather than a fact finding mission to 
assess the situation in Fiji as the Forum had done, illustrated undeniably that the 
Commonwealth was in line with New Zealand’s policy of exclusion rather than engagement. 
As with the Pacific Islands Forum, the Commonwealth of Nations was carefully following 
Bainimarama’s commitment to hold open democratic elections by March 2009.447 In terms 
of process the Commonwealth set up a Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group to consult 
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with important leaders and organisations in Fiji so as to work towards restoring democratic 
rule to Fiji.448 Despite PNG initially voting for the suspension of Fiji immediately following the 
coup, Prime Minister Sogavare announced at the Commonwealth Heads of Government 
Meeting (CHOGM) in November 2007 that the PNG government would be providing 
US$41,000 to Fiji for the planned 2009 Fiji elections.449 This timing lines up with PNG appeals 
at the Pacific Islands Forum and the MSG to engage with Fiji and help Fiji meet its March 
2009 deadline.  
The Commonwealth position, like that of the Pacific Islands Forum was to exclude Fiji from 
Commonwealth activities until Fiji had returned to democratic rule.450 With Bainimarama’s 
continual stalling around election dates, eventual admission that elections would not be held 
by March 2009 and the passing of the Fiji deadline, the Commonwealth was further pushed 
towards a full suspension of Fiji from the group.451 On the 31st of July 2009 nine 
Commonwealth Foreign Ministers including New Zealand’s Murray McCully met in London to 
discuss the future of Fiji’s membership.452 A further deadline was made with September 1st 
the final day to announce elections that were to be held no later than October 2010.453 With 
the passing of September 1st and no commitment to hold elections earlier than 2014, Fiji was 
officially fully suspended from the Commonwealth on the 2nd of September 2009.454 New 
Zealand’s Foreign Minister McCully commented that the suspension would mean “an end to 
technical assistance to Fiji, except assistance aimed at restoring democracy, and Fiji will not 
be able to participate in Commonwealth sporting events, including next year's 
Commonwealth Games.”455 The ban on Commonwealth Games’ attendance can be seen as 
one of the most significant aspects of the suspension. Fiji has a very strong sporting culture 
and being prevented from attending the 2010 Delhi Commonwealth games must have had a 
sizable impact upon Fiji. 456 
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Overall, the Commonwealth appears to have followed a similar policy direction to that of the 
Forum. New Zealand and Australian influence can undoubtedly be seen as at least partly 
responsible for the approach taken by the Commonwealth. Many Commonwealth countries 
have varying degrees of human rights abuses but seldom has action from the group been as 
swift as it was in the case of Fiji following the 2006 coup. In this respect, it closely mirrored 
New Zealand’s immediate and firm policy response. Once again the Commonwealth 
response, like that of the Pacific Islands Forum appears to have been more critical of Fiji due 
to New Zealand and Australian pressure.  
The impact of Regional Organisations following the coup 
The impact that New Zealand’s policy towards Fiji has had on regional organisations and 
‘like-minded’ states following the coup so far has been mixed. While Australia shared the 
tough sanction-based approach held by New Zealand, this was not echoed throughout the 
other states of the South Pacific. The Commonwealth of Nations quickly made its view clear 
by suspending Fiji, reflecting the stances taken by New Zealand and Australia and giving 
credibility to an exclusionary approach. Other parties’ responses were far more reserved. 
Despite the Forum condemning the actions of coup leaders, it did not believe sanctions were 
appropriate and felt that engagement and encouragement towards Fiji was more valuable 
than excluding them. The will that was present in suspending Fiji from the Commonwealth 
was clearly not present in the Forum in early 2007. The Melanesian Spearhead group went 
to the other extreme supporting Fiji as an independent state and openly advocating support 
for Fiji should other states try and suspend them from the Forum.  
In contrast to New Zealand’s established regional presence in the South Pacific, the PRC’s 
investment and interaction with the Melanesian Spearhead Group has undoubtedly given 
the group a greater presence in the region. With better finance and a formal secretariat, the 
MSG has become a more vocal actor in the South Pacific giving an alternative perspective to 
Australia and New Zealand in the region. While the 2010 meetings to pass the Chairmanship 
of the Group over to Fiji were eventually postponed, the attempt to appoint Bainimarama as 
the Chairperson of the organisation reveals the division between the MSG and the Pacific 
Islands Forum. With greater PRC support, the MSG has the potential to become more 
powerful in the region and may prove to be a polarising force in the Forum. Even if the 
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implications of PRC support for the Group were not foreseen, the increased presence has 
damaged the cohesiveness of the Forum.  
What the responses from the various stakeholder groups showed was that the region was 
fragmented in its approach to the Fiji issue. As a consequence, New Zealand’s policy stance 
may have been persuasive, particularly in the Commonwealth and less so in the Forum. Still 
a clear and decisive regional action in line with New Zealand’s sanction-based policy towards 
Fiji was unable to be reached. This went so far as to risk dividing the Forum into those states 
who supported engagement with Fiji and those who supported sanctioning the regime. It is 
reasonably certain that PRC support for the MSG following the Fiji coup was not as a 
response to the coup itself. Nevertheless, this support has damaged New Zealand’s position 
in the Pacific Islands Forum by giving a more sympathetic soapbox for Bainimarama 
credibility. Overall, New Zealand has been proactive by using its influence to push for unified 
pressure on Fiji, while by contrast, the PRC has been much more passive, but has perhaps 
unwittingly hampered New Zealand’s efforts through its support of the MSG. 
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Chapter five: Conclusion 
The 2006 Fiji coup was responded to in very different ways by the PRC and New Zealand. 
New Zealand had become increasingly focussed on reforming the political structures and 
practices of Pacific Island states in what was an increasingly ‘carrot and stick’ approach to 
development assistance: conditional aid as an incentive, unilateral and multilateral sanctions 
as a deterrent. The PRC was in a very different position, despite having a presence in the 
South Pacific for decades, actual influence had been limited. The drive to secure diplomatic 
recognition in contest with Taiwan was the primary focus of their involvement in the South 
Pacific. Small underdeveloped island states with small populations possessed the same UN 
voting power as much larger countries making the South Pacific an ideal candidate for 
PRC/ROC chequebook diplomacy.457 As the PRC economy began its phase of rapid growth, 
the demand for raw materials meant the South Pacific had become useful to the PRC for 
more than simply recognition, it was a valuable cache of resources to fuel economic 
expansion.458  
Taking into account the background to New Zealand’s policy direction in the South Pacific 
and the fact that sanctions had been put in place following the previous coups, the 
restrictions placed on Fiji on December the 5th and 6th 2006 seem to be a predictable 
response. Because New Zealand has trade, diplomatic and security interests that benefit 
from a politically stable South Pacific, the sanctions were designed to pressure Fiji into 
holding democratic elections which would hopefully stabilise the Fijian political situation.459 
By restricting travel, sporting, military contacts, seasonal worker schemes and diplomatic 
engagement, New Zealand was attempting to not only manipulate public opinion in Fiji 
against the Bainimarama government, but also encourage the international community to 
put even greater pressure on Fiji.460 
However, the 2006 Fiji coup can be distinguished from the previous Fiji coups in a number of 
significant ways, which made New Zealand’s policy less effective. These were both internal 
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factors in Fiji as well as wider changes to the region and more active outside powers. Unlike 
the 1987 and 2000 coups it did not appear to be a coup to entrench and extend the rights of 
indigenous Fijians.461 In fact the 2006 coup appeared to be doing the opposite, by calling for 
harsher sentences for those involved in the 2000 coup and going against Qoliqoli rights that 
would undoubtedly have benefitted ethnic Fijians and harmed the rights of Indian Fijians.462 
Furthermore, Bainimarama was someone that New Zealand had supported in his armed 
removal of George Speight in 2000.463 There was no loss of life sustained by the coup, nor 
was there any significant damage to infrastructure and so it could not be seen as urgent a 
concern as conflicts in other South Pacific states such as the Solomon Islands, PNG or 
Bougainville.464 
The 2006 coup was an event that took place with reasonable public support in Fiji for 
Bainimarama after the democratically elected government was seen by Indo Fijians as 
entrenching and increasing racial divisions and by the ethnic Fijians as unreasonably 
cooperating with the Indo Fijian-dominated FLP in coalition with Qarase’s party.465 The 
election result and coalition compromise seems to have been unfavourable to both the FLP 
and the NFP. Unlike the Speight coup and even the Rabuka coups, the 2006 coup did not 
have the same divisions in Fijian society with a distinctive half supporting the coup and the 
other half against it.466 By heavily sanctioning the regime in an attempt to pressure the 
people to rise up against the government, despite reasonable public support in Fiji for 
Bainimarama the impact of the New Zealand approach was lessened. This could be explained 
by the fact that the military was controlling Fiji and the unarmed public did not feel as 
though they could overthrow the government, but at this stage many of the restrictions on 
the freedom of press and association had not been put in place. The people still had a 
reasonable number of channels to protest against the Bainimarama government, yet 
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widespread protests did not take place. This suggests that the people of Fiji were not 
necessarily as opposed to the Bainimarama takeover as the New Zealand government were.  
Not only did New Zealand’s sanctions fail to encourage public uprising, the December 2006 
restrictions on the Bainimarama government left little room for escalation. Because the 
Clark government was targeting such a wide range of sanctions from the outset, when the 
situation deteriorated in Fiji with the expulsion of New Zealand’s High Commissioners and 
the crackdown on the judiciary and media in Fiji, no further unilateral sanctions could be put 
in place. This was despite strong rhetoric from the Clark government that New Zealand 
would increase its sanctions on the Bainimarama regime.467 What this effectively means is 
that the strong stance taken by the New Zealand government following the coup limited its 
ability to adequately condemn the actions of the Bainimarama government at a later date. 
A further problem with the Clark government’s response to the 2006 coup is that the 
majority of the sanctions required a unified response from the international community, in 
order to pressure the Fijian government into holding democratic elections. This did not take 
place, criticism and pressure from the European Union, New Zealand, Australia, The United 
States and other international actors’ was not accompanied by similar condemnation from 
other increasingly important countries such as the PRC. Instead the PRC has capitalised on 
international actors’ exclusion of Fiji by replacing them in roles they had previously held 
before the coup. In particular Chinese ties with the Fijian military increased immediately 
after the coup.468 This problem has been paralleled by the sanctions and international 
pressure placed on regimes such as the military junta in Myanmar.469 The sanctions and 
international pressure placed on Myanmar has been diluted by PRC support for the 
regime.470 The international community has lacked a unified response to the human rights 
abuses in the country and so the impact of the restrictions and pressure has been limited.471 
States have had little success in changing the PRC position towards Myanmar and despite 
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strong condemnation of the military junta very little constructive dialogue has taken place 
with Beijing to deliver a unified international response.472  
While PRC support for Fiji has increased following the coup it is unlikely the PRC is engaging 
Fiji more because of the 2006 coup directly; the PRC is becoming more involved in all South 
Pacific states that recognise the PRC irrespective of their systems of government and 
relationships with neighbouring states. Many of the commitments of support to Fiji were 
made under the democratically-elected Qarase administration, and even Mahendra 
Chaudhry visited the PRC in 1999.473 Like PRC support to African states, interaction is not 
conditional on the domestic political situations of sovereign states, it instead focuses on 
recognition and resource acquisition.474 Because support from New Zealand and other 
Western states was removed following the 2006 coup, the military takeover gave the PRC 
the opportunity to expand its influence in Fiji. This is particularly noticeable in military joint 
exercises that were previously held between Fiji and New Zealand now being carried out 
between the PRC and Fiji.475 By suspending interactions with the RFMF, the PRC has taken 
over what was previously an area of New Zealand-Fiji cooperation. Importantly, this 
initiative was one that was pushed by Bainimarama as means to seek new avenues of 
international support following the 2006 coup to replace that lost through Western powers’ 
sanctions.476 This is significant as it shows that Fiji is actively seeking support from the PRC to 
fill the gaps left by New Zealand’s sanctions, rather than the PRC deliberately and assertively 
seeking to capitalise on the 2006 coup.  
Regardless of the intentions of the PRC following the coup, Chinese support has effectively 
reduced the impact of New Zealand’s sanctions in a number of key areas. Trading links as 
well as traditional diplomatic ties have shifted in favour of the PRC following the 2006 
coup.477 A number of high profile visits of PRC officials to Suva and invitations for 
Bainimarama to travel to China have treated Bainimarama as a legitimate leader of a 
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sovereign state, something New Zealand disputes.478 What this diplomatic engagement with 
Bainimarama does is give the coup administration a degree of legitimacy. By inviting 
members of the Bainimarama government the leadership is treated like any other 
international actor, consequently, the pressure put on the international community by New 
Zealand to isolate Fiji begins to lack credibility. With statements from the PRC calling the Fiji 
coup a “domestic matter”479 and Bainimarama treating the PRC as a “significant friend”,480 
the Fijian government is given international credibility and treated as a legitimate 
international actor by Beijing. One of New Zealand’s goals in imposing sanctions on Fiji 
following the coup was to isolate the state from the international community and effectively 
pressure Fiji to hold democratic elections, by engaging diplomatically with Fiji the PRC has 
undermined this policy goal. 
The diplomatic relationship between Suva and Beijing has not been entirely one-sided with 
the PRC being a friend to Fiji without reciprocity. Following the 2008 crackdown on Tibetan 
rioters by the PRC government, Bainimarama wrote to Beijing stating that the PRC response 
was a matter of national security and a purely domestic issue for the Chinese government.481 
This stand taken by Bainimarama shows that diplomatic engagement with the PRC is 
certainly beneficial for both countries. The PRC supported Bainimarama following the coup 
giving credibility to the Fijian government as well as providing aid and other assistance. At 
the same time Fiji is supported by the PRC, not only by providing investment opportunities 
for Chinese businesses but also political support for PRC actions against protestors in 
Tibet.482  
PRC support following the 2006 coup has not been purely diplomatic; trade and tourism 
have been important areas of increased cooperation between the PRC and Fiji.  While the 
granting of Approved Destination Status (ADS) was granted to Fiji before the coup,483 greater 
commitments have been made since the 2006 coup took place.484 Fiji was included in the 
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multimillion dollar Pacific Pavilion at the World Shanghai Expo in 2010 despite its suspension 
from the Pacific Islands Forum.485 This tourism cooperation must be viewed as an emerging 
and evolving area of engagement with large numbers of tourists from Australia and New 
Zealand accounting for the majority of visitors to Fiji despite the sanctions put in place by 
the New Zealand government.486 Regardless of visa restrictions being relaxed for Chinese 
tourists in Fiji and ADS as well as an Air Services Agreement with the PRC, allegedly only one 
percent of tourists visiting Fiji are from China.487 Although the PRC has some private 
investment in the tourism area in Fiji, apart from structural and procedural changes the 
Chinese government has not directly invested in the sector.488 Overall, the tourism market is 
still dominated by New Zealand and Australia, despite the December 2006 sanctions. 
In terms of development aid, the PRC has certainly been more vocal about its support for 
Fijian projects following the 2006 coup. The PRC still provides development aid on an ad hoc 
basis rather than through sustainable long-term commitments. Support is delivered between 
governments rather than through local and international NGOs operating in Fiji.489  This is in 
part due to the commitments made in the 2006 Ministerial Conference, in particular the 
US$600 million soft loan facility set up at the 2006 meeting has been utilised by the Fijian 
government to support infrastructure projects such as low cost housing.490 From large 
projects such as the Navuso Bridge and Somosomo hydro power station491 to smaller 
operations like the fencing of Government House492 and fertilizer grants, the PRC provides 
aid on a project by project basis.493 This is significant as it demonstrates that the PRC has a 
very short-term outlook towards Fiji and the South Pacific and suggests that they do not 
have a comprehensive long term strategy for Fiji and the region. 
In contrast, New Zealand aid to Fiji has a long term development focus. Despite removing aid 
that was distributed by the Fijian government, NZAID continued to operate through NGOs in 
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Fiji following the coup.494 New Zealand’s aid is not delivered on the same ad hoc basis as PRC 
aid; instead it is structured under the overarching policies of the Pacific Strategy 2007-2014 
and the Forum initiative the Pacific Plan.495 The different approaches to aid have significant 
implications for the relationship between New Zealand, the PRC and Fiji. Firstly, the problem 
with the ad hoc approach to aid in Fiji following the coup is that it fails to address the 
underlying problems within Fiji such as the root causes of poverty. Power projects and 
housing loans lack an overarching strategy for long-term prosperity in Fiji. By contrast, New 
Zealand may have considerably less financial resources than the PRC, yet the New Zealand 
approach is to improve the underlying processes and institutions that educate and improve 
the opportunities of Fijians to alleviate poverty.496 
Hanson has been particularly critical of the PRC response to the 2006 coup and its 
engagement with Bainimarama, saying that the way that China operates is to build large 
infrastructure projects without a long-term development strategy or consideration of the 
maintenance costs of such projects on the fragile economies of states such as Fiji.497  This 
does appear to be true, but rather than an argument entirely against the PRC approach to 
the South Pacific, it is evidence that the PRC is not in fact a substitute for New Zealand Aid in 
Fiji. It is obvious that the New Zealand government simply could not afford to pay for the 
larger projects that are funded by the Chinese Government and as such these projects can 
be a valuable addition to the consistent aid that New Zealand delivers in Fiji. Problems are 
not necessarily with the scale of such projects, but rather with the suitability and 
construction of them in the Fijian environment as well as the associated debt burden.  
A key problem when looking at the commitments made by the PRC in Fiji following the coup 
(as in other areas in the South Pacific) is that they do not necessarily result in the projects 
being carried out.498 This is due to a number of key factors, firstly the bureaucratic processes 
of the PRC are a major barrier when accessing funds allocated for South Pacific projects.499 
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The complex government structures of the PRC means that aid policy is carried out by the 
Ministry of Commerce under the Department of Aid to Foreign Countries responsible for the 
drafting and allocation of aid policies, the Bureau for International Economic Cooperation is 
then responsible for the implementation of aid. Soft loans are then processed and funded by 
government owned banking institutions.500 This is all done outside of the PRC Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. This structure effectively means that commitments made by government 
officials and diplomatic representatives are often difficult to process and implement through 
the PRC system. As a result, funding commitments are very difficult to actually access. This 
was shown with the Fijian government’s attempts to secure funding following the 1st 
Ministerial Conference, when only a fraction of what was asked for was actually delivered.501 
PRC bureaucracy has not been the only obstacle in actually delivering the commitments 
made following the coup, China’s expansion into Fiji has left it without an established 
implementation structure for its commitments to be put into action. NZAID has used 
established NGO mechanisms to implement aid policies following the coup.502 The problem 
with the PRC approach is that by limiting its implementation to be either through the Fijian 
government or directly by using PRC materials, labour and direction, the process is likely to 
be significantly longer, if it can be delivered at all.503  
These factors are not a reason for PRC commitments to Fiji following the coup to be 
overlooked, but they cast a degree of doubt on the real level of development aid going to 
Fiji. The problem is, due to the lack of transparency surrounding the implementation of 
Chinese aid policy, it is difficult to actually assess the real impact PRC funding is having. The 
figures stated by think tanks such as the Lowy Institute in Australia allege $US 206 million of 
grants and loans were earmarked for the South Pacific in 2008. These are likely to overstate 
the actual amount that is allocated to the South Pacific.504 A large amount of the media 
attention surrounding PRC involvement in Fiji following the coup is created through official 
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statements made by the Bainimarama regime, it is likely that they have been exaggerated 
partly to show the international community that their sanctions were ineffective and, 
secondly, to prove to the people of Fiji that the coup was not harming their international 
support. 
Another key criticism of PRC engagement in Fiji following the coup and also in other South 
Pacific states is the debt burden of PRC soft loans.505 Because these loans are low interest 
they are often taken up by small states because the amounts of money simply would not be 
available from smaller donor states such as New Zealand (see appendix one for a detailed 
breakdown of financial support in 2008). These loans form the basis of PRC foreign financial 
assistance.506 The problem with these loans in Fiji and throughout the South Pacific is that, 
despite the fact that they are low interest and have a procedure in place to be converted 
into a grant, there is no guarantee that these loans will in fact be overlooked when they 
reach maturity. Furthermore, even at a low interest rate of 2% they have the potential to be 
crippling for an impoverished island state.507 What this means for Fiji is that by accepting 
these loans, Fiji is becoming increasingly financially reliant on the PRC.  
Regional organisations following the coup 
Both New Zealand and the PRC have been involved with relevant international organisations 
in different ways following the coup, New Zealand through the PIF and the PRC by funding 
MSG activities. The impact of the countries’ stance at a regional level is still very much an 
evolving issue, particularly with the 2010 series of postponed MSG meetings. New Zealand 
can be seen as being ultimately successful in its bid to persuade the Forum to pressure Fiji 
into holding elections with the eventual suspension of the Fijian government from the 
Forum in 2009.508 The problem with the New Zealand policy to use regional and 
international influence to pressure Fiji is that its approach is not shared by all Forum 
member states.509 Despite unanimity at the meeting to put in place criteria to suspend Fiji, 
the actual suspension was not voted for unanimously but was an automatic decision as the 
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deadline to announce elections passed.510 With Melanesian states such as the Solomon 
Islands and PNG openly advocating for greater engagement with Fiji, regardless of an official 
Forum position excluding Fijian involvement, the Forum has shown clear divisions.511 This rift 
has been exacerbated by Samoan attempts to have the Forum secretariat moved from Suva 
to Apia in an attempt to capitalise on the condemnation of the Fijian government by 
Australia and New Zealand.512  
The greater presence of the MSG has further fractured the Forum’s position. The MSG has 
lacked consistency in its stance towards Fiji, particularly in 2010 with the continual 
postponement of meetings that eventually handed the chairmanship over to 
Bainimarama.513 The group has often called for greater engagement with Fiji, a position that 
certainly has not been shared by New Zealand and Australia.514 As an autonomous regional 
organisation the MSG position has not stalled the unanimity of the Forum in its decision 
making processes, however it has effectively undermined the position the Forum has taken 
on Fiji as the Group continues to engage with Bainimarama. This problem has been 
exacerbated in 2010 with the PRC funded annual MSG meeting where the chairmanship of 
the organisation was to be transferred from Vanuatu to Fiji.515 Seeking to use the 
opportunity to gain support from other Pacific Island states Bainimarama invited the Foreign 
Ministers of non-MSG member states to attend.516 This invitation risked the role of the MSG 
changing from a regional block to a greater lobby group in the region to balance the voices 
of Australia and New Zealand. The invitations to New Zealand and Australian Foreign 
Ministers were revoked soon after they had been offered.517 This meeting officially did not 
take place, instead becoming the ‘friends of Fiji’ meeting at the last minute.518 Regardless, 
this attempt to polarise the South Pacific shows the potential threat posed by a more 
powerful MSG that includes Fiji. The former Deputy Prime Minister of Vanuatu Sato Kilman 
said that the MSG was as an “emergence of a political will to offer an alternative to 
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hegemonic domination on regional issues."519 If the Forum is divided and cannot reach 
consensus in its decision-making, the organisation can no longer function.  
The stance that the MSG has taken towards Fiji following the coup cannot be directly 
attributed to the PRC; the PRC is not a member of the group. However, it is extremely 
unlikely that the MSG would have had the same presence and publicity without PRC funding 
of the Vanuatu secretariat and the 2010 AGM. PRC support for the MSG has effectively given 
the Group a more prominent presence in the region and subsequently given Bainimarama as 
a member, a greater ability to speak out against the New Zealand position. Rather than 
viewing this as a deliberate move by the PRC to undermine the New Zealand approach 
towards Fiji, it is yet another example of Chinese involvement with whomever they choose, 
regardless of the wider implications to the member states and the region. The MSG has been 
often touted as a real threat to the Pacific Islands Forum and Pacific unity since its 
conception.520 So the fact that the PRC has given this group more resources appears to be a 
result of a policy that overlooks the wider implications of Chinese interaction within the 
region.  
New Zealand vowed to actively engage the international community and regional 
organisations in an attempt to pressure Fiji following the 2006 coup, predominantly through 
the Pacific Islands Forum. The PRC provided resources and funding to a potentially divisive 
actor in the South Pacific, that despite a lack of coherence in policy, has actively called for 
engagement with Fiji in contrast to the New Zealand position. In this way both New Zealand 
and the PRC can be seen as responsible for a polarisation of the South Pacific following the 
coup. The Clark and Key governments in New Zealand, along with Australia, pressured other 
Pacific Island states to isolate Fiji. The lack of real will in the Forum to adopt the stance of 
New Zealand and Australia is clear with the delay in suspending Fiji, and member states 
sporadically calling for greater engagement with Bainimarama. By empowering Melanesian 
states through the MSG, the PRC has further increased this rift. 
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Would the Chinese involvement in Fiji have been the same if the 2006 coup 
had not taken place? 
In 2009, at a meeting of the NZ-Fiji Business Council, Minister of Foreign Affairs Murray 
McCully responded to critics of New Zealand’s policy towards Fiji and claims that sanctions 
had opened the door for China to replace New Zealand in Fiji.521 McCully said the following:  
 
China is a rising superpower with an interest in acquiring markets and resources in this 
region. With or without a coup, China would be a strong player in the region, and a 
strong competitor in our markets.522 
This appears to be only a partially valid statement; it is true that the PRC is engaging other 
South Pacific states, and as an emerging superpower certainly won’t be restrained by a small 
state such as New Zealand.  However, what New Zealand’s sanctions did is provide an 
opportunity for the PRC to become more involved in Fiji and effectively replace New 
Zealand’s involvement in areas such as military training. It is unlikely this transition would 
have been as rapid if the coup had not taken place and New Zealand had not sanctioned Fiji 
providing the PRC with the opportunity to take over some of the areas that New Zealand had 
restricted.  
This substitution effect has not meant that New Zealand’s sanctions have been entirely 
ineffectual, areas such as sporting contacts and travel sanctions could not be replaced by an 
opportunistic PRC. The reality is that New Zealand is the home of many Fijians whose 
families still reside in Fiji; even Bainimarama’s relatives live in New Zealand. This link simply 
cannot be replaced by a more involved China. The same can be said about sporting contact, 
New Zealand’s involvement in sports such as rugby and netball are the same as those played 
in Fiji. More New Zealanders visit Fiji as tourists than Chinese people despite the chilly 
relationship between Wellington and Suva.523 So even though the PRC has undoubtedly 
gained a greater stake in Fiji following the coup, it is currently not possible for it to fully 
replace New Zealand.  
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The future of New Zealand and the PRC in Fiji  
In 2010, it is difficult to assess the future of PRC and New Zealand involvement in Fiji as so 
much depends on whether elections are held in 2014. It is unlikely the New Zealand position 
would relax significantly towards Fiji unless credible steps are taken that indicate free and 
fair elections are going to take place. In the years following the coup, sporadic criticism has 
suggested that the position towards Fiji could be relaxed, particularly in Australian politics.524 
In the lead-up to the 2010 Australian general election both Julia Gillard and Tony Abbot were 
called on to “mend Pacific fences” and engage with Fiji to show Australia’s commitment to 
consensus decision-making in the Forum.525 An actual shift in policy is yet to occur, but if it 
does the New Zealand government is likely to follow suit. Evidence that a new approach is 
needed has been shown with the United States announcing that a new USAID office would 
be built in Suva as the central operations point for US aid to the South Pacific.526 The 
Bainimarama government has called this a signal of a changing approach to the Fiji situation, 
with Permanent Secretary to the Prime Minister’s Office Pio Tikoduada calling the move a 
show of confidence in Fiji, something other states should follow.527 As the US position is 
becoming more flexible it is possible that New Zealand could also become more flexible 
before the 2014 election date. This is particularly significant given that the current sanctions 
in place by New Zealand have not effectively pressured Fiji to hold elections before 2014.  
Despite New Zealand isolating Fiji and being replaced by the PRC in a number of key areas, 
New Zealand still continues to be a significant trading partner for Fiji and the home of many 
Fijians. These factors are likely to remain, regardless of the political climate between Suva 
and Wellington, although Fiji-PRC trade is likely to increase in the future. When the 
Bainimarama government is replaced, New Zealand will likely be able to resume normal 
diplomatic engagements with Fiji. With general elections held every three years in New 
Zealand: new governments have the ability to change foreign policy direction and escape the 
less effective policies of the previous administration.  
The future position of the PRC in Fiji is equally difficult to determine. However, until the 
Taiwan issue is resolved, ROC-PRC rivalry is likely to influence PRC policy in the South Pacific. 
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It is true that the PRC has actively engaged with Fiji following the coup; however the long 
term sustainability of the relationship is not assured. The relaxing of visa requirements for 
Chinese tourists by the Bainimarama government risks a greater influx of illegal Chinese 
overstayers.528 Visas were deliberately tightened up by the Qarase government to try and 
address the already growing issues of transnational crime and other criminal activities 
carried out by Chinese migrants in Fiji.529 The problem is not only with illegal migrants, but 
also with Chinese living legally in Fiji replacing Fijian citizens in jobs traditionally held by 
locals, fostering resentment and possible conflict.530 Given Fiji’s history since independence 
of forceful entrenchment of indigenous Fijian rights, it seems entirely plausible that this 
influx of new Chinese migrants has the potential to be a grave domestic issue for the 
Bainimarama government. While this cannot be seen as a direct policy of the PRC it is a 
symptom of greater Chinese involvement in Fiji. This issue is compounded by difficult 
extradition procedures preventing the successful relocation of overstayers and other illegal 
migrants back to the People’s Republic. If this is not addressed bilaterally between the PRC 
and Fiji this has the potential to damage the long term relationship between the two 
countries.  
The PRC responded to the 2006 coup by treating the seizure of power as a purely ‘domestic 
issue’, assistance then continued as it had before the coup. The issue with this approach is 
that should the Bainimarama government be removed from power either through a counter-
coup or through democratic elections, the PRC risks being seen by the domestic Fijian 
population as a supporter of an unfavourable and repressive government. The lack of 
organised resistance against the Bainimarama regime may suggest that it has a degree of 
local support or at least domestic indifference towards the government. Bainimarama has 
made it clear that the traditional roles New Zealand and Australia played in Fiji have been 
replaced by China. This link has been compounded by the issue of PRC aid tending to be 
intergovernmental rather than through NGOs and other local distribution mechanisms, the 
PRC is linked with the government of Fiji more than it is with the Fijian people. Certainly, the 
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benefits of Chinese projects such as stadiums are felt at a ground level, but the key 
diplomatic interaction is intergovernmental. The PRC has put little effort into public 
diplomacy efforts to improve its relations with the wider public in Fiji.531 This could 
potentially mean that the PRC could lose its influence in Fiji should the Bainimarama 
government be overthrown. 
The South Pacific region 
The impact of this difference in approach to the South Pacific following the coup is part of a 
wider issue in the South Pacific. The 2006 coup shows very clearly where New Zealand and 
PRC policy have clashed, but this is a phenomena occurring throughout the region to varying 
degrees. The fact that PRC support ostensibly only requires recognition of the Chinese state 
as well as the potentially huge amounts of money offered by the PRC, makes the conditional 
New Zealand approach to the South Pacific less desirable. The substitution of New Zealand 
support for PRC support in some areas is almost an inevitability, given the opportunities 
offered by the PRC to these small island states. Across the South Pacific, Chinese investment 
has increased dramatically and many states have signed up to previously unheard of levels of 
Chinese debt. With PRC development aid has come an increasing PRC presence in local 
island economies with jobs previously held by Pacific islanders being taken by new Chinese 
migrants.532 This increasing foreign population has been resisted and challenged by local 
island communities with violence directed against Chinese in Tonga, the Solomon Islands, 
Tahiti, PNG as well as in Fiji and other South Pacific states.533 
Consistency of aid is a problem in Fiji and the South Pacific region. The 1st Ministerial 
Conference of China Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum 
in 2006 promised a much greater PRC presence in the South Pacific. This meeting was 
supposed to be held every four years with the next meeting to be held in Beijing in 2010.534 
Despite the greater PRC presence in the region there has been no indication that a second 
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conference will even take place. The PRC government has failed to respond to requests for a 
date when the next meeting will be held. This lack of consistency means that New Zealand is 
unlikely to be replaced by the PRC, despite the bigger commitments and less direct 
conditionality of PRC development aid. New Zealand’s structured aid programme may be 
dependent on a number of conditions but it has long-term targets for South Pacific states 
and assures stable and ongoing aid to provide for “sustainable economic development.”535 
 
The disconnect between PRC commitments and assistance delivery is another issue for the 
South Pacific. Not only is PRC support given on an ad hoc basis, it is also often difficult to 
receive after it has been promised. The lack of implementation infrastructure as well as 
bureaucratic difficulties in the PRC government mean that Pacific States have not been able 
to effectively capitalise on Beijing’s promises of a greater relationship. There appears to be a 
considerable disconnect between what is committed and what is provided. Despite the PRC 
increasing its aid commitments to the South Pacific with rough estimations of between 
US$100 million and US$150 million per year, this is still dwarfed by Australia’s contribution 
of over US$400 million to the region.536 China is certainly an important new actor in the 
South Pacific but is not the most powerful and involved country yet. 
The PRC has undoubtedly become more engaged with the South Pacific from 2006-2010, 
offering new opportunities to island states such as soft loans, diplomatic support and 
infrastructure development. Rather than an alternative to the traditional players in the 
region this support ought to be viewed as additional and not necessarily competing. The 
governments of both New Zealand and Australia have shown little interest in exploiting 
natural resources in Forum member states, instead focussing on building stability in the 
region. China’s search for resources and recognition does not need to undermine the policy 
goals of New Zealand and Australia. Nor do trans-Tasman objectives necessarily need to 
conflict with the policies of the PRC. What needs to happen to reduce the policy conflict 
seen with the 2006 Fiji coup, is a greater willingness by all sides to work cooperatively 
together to develop a cohesive and coherent strategy enabling them to effectively deal with 
such crises. By supporting potentially divisive groups such as the MSG the PRC is not acting 
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as a responsible power in the region and perhaps unwittingly has further polarised the 
Pacific Islands Forum. Likewise, New Zealand’s policy pressure in the Pacific Islands Forum 
and Commonwealth has further entrenched the divide between the trans-Tasman 
partnership and the other Forum member states. Should the current anarchic opportunism 
continue the region is likely to become less stable as the PRC attempts to exploit resources 
and form diplomatic allegiances without a wider strategy of engagement. Meanwhile, New 
Zealand works to pressure and condemn unruly Forum Member states. An unstable region 
impacts negatively upon both New Zealand and PRC interests. As such, New Zealand and the 
PRC need to work out a way to co-exist and look to develop a more coherent strategy to 
protect the stability of the regional organisations and the South Pacific as a whole.    
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Appendix 1 
PRC and New Zealand financial support to the South Pacific 2008537 
 PRC538 New Zealand539 
Cook Islands US$2.9 million (US$1.1 million loans) US$3.4 million 
Federated States of 
Micronesia 
US$4.5 million  
 
US$0.1 million 
Fiji US$6.9 million (US$83.1 million 
loans) 
US$1.8 million 
Kiribati - US$2.3 million 
Nauru - US$0.8 million 
Niue US$0.2 million 
 
US$16 million 
PNG 
 
US$10.23million US$13 million 
Samoa US$6.7 million (US$40 million loans) US$6.9 million 
Solomon Islands - US$20.4 million 
Tonga US$20.5 million US$10.3 million 
Tokelau - US$14.2 million 
Tuvalu - US$2.2 million 
Vanuatu US$1.4 million (US$28.8 million 
loans) 
US$7.5 million 
Total US$53.33 million (US$153 million 
loans) 
US$98.9 million 
                                                          
537
 Please note this table should serve as an indication of the financial support provided by New Zealand and 
the PRC in 2008. NZAID figures are for the 2007/2008 financial year while PRC figures are for the 2008 Calendar 
year. 
538
 Fergus Hanson, "China: Stumbling Through the Pacific," (Lowy Institute for International Policy 2009). Please 
note this is an estimate and some of the projects may be funded through soft loans announced in 2006. Some 
funding may not be included. 
539
 "NZAID Annual Review 2007/2008,"  (NZAID, 2008). 10 Please note this figure has been converted from NZD 
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